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CURRENCY RISK AND IMPERFECT KNOWLEDGE: 
COINTEGRATED VAR ANALYSES WITH SURVEY DATA
by
Josh R. Stillwagon 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2013
Much progress has been made in understanding excess returns in the for­
eign exchange market through the use of survey data on traders’ exchange 
rate forecasts. On the whole, this literature, which is reviewed in chapter 
1, has found that excess returns derive from both violations of the ratio­
nal expectations hypothesis (non white-noise forecast errors) as well as a 
time-varying risk premium. W hat this literature has not done however is 
to determine whether any of the existing models of the risk premium can 
account for the time-varying risk premium found in survey data. The second 
and third chapters use the Cointegrated VAR model to test the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM), the Consumption CAPM, and the Keynes-Imperfect 
Knowledge Economics (IKE) gap model, which relate the risk premium to 
the exchange rate’s variance, covariance with consumption, and deviation 
from Purchasing Power Parity respectively. The strongest support is found 
for the Keynes-IKE gap model. The analysis of this model is then extended
in chapter 4 to the 1(2) CVAR framework, which is a unique empirical ap­
proach designed to account for data which undergoes persistent changes over 
time without the need for data transformations which cause a loss of infor­
mation. The 1(2) model also allows for more rigorous testing of the theory 
and a better examination of the dynamics between the exchange rate, expec­
tations, prices, and interest rates. The Keynes-IKE gap model still performs 
quite well. Further, persistent changes are found for the real exchange rate 
in several instances, which is problematic for standard REH theory but fully 
compatible with the IKE theory.
xiv
1  CHAPTER I: THE EXCESS RETURNS PUZZLE IN CUR­
RENCY MARKETS: CLUES ON M OVING FORWARD
Abstract
The first chapter is designed to review the empirical literature on the 
excess returns puzzle: the difficulty encountered by expected utility the­
ory (EUT) and rational expectation hypothesis (REH) based risk premium 
models in accounting for relative returns in the foreign exchange market. Of 
particular interest are the studies using survey data to decompose ex post 
excess returns into an expected component - the risk premium - and a fore­
cast error. On the whole, these studies have found evidence of violations of 
the rational expectations hypothesis (non-white noise forecast errors), and a 
time-varying risk premium. This suggests the need for an alternative speci­
fication of forecasting. The literature has left open however the question of 
whether the traditional models can account for movements in the premium 
as measured by survey. Although the traditional models have not been tested 
against survey data, there is reason from the outset to believe EUT provides a 
deficient foundation for a risk premium model. Experimental evidence is dis­
cussed showing that the predictions of EUT are grossly inconsistent with the 
behavior of actual subjects towards risky gambles. Lastly, the chapter dis­
cusses alternative models of risk preferences drawing from the experimental 
findings on prospect theory, and ways in which their testing can be improved 
through use of the 1(2) Cointegrated VAR model.
1
1.1 In trodu ction
Much of the theory that financial economists have developed over the past 
five decades to understand the behavior of relative, or excess, returns in 
asset markets is based on expected utility theory (EUT) and the rational 
expectations hypothesis (REH). It is uncontroversial to say th a t the empirical 
performance of these theories has been dismal.1 Most empirical studies make 
use of data on ex post returns as a proxy for expected returns, invoking 
REH’s implication of white-noise forecast errors. This allows for only indirect 
tests of the models’ implications for ex ante returns, which derive from the 
specification of risk preferences. The wide-spread rejection of these models 
raises a key question: does the failure arise from their specification of risk 
preferences and/or the assumption of REH?
In this chapter, I survey the empirical record for clues on this question 
and directions for further needed inquiry. I focus primarily on the research 
concerning currency markets, which arguably has made the most progress 
in uncovering the source of the failure; in part because of the availability of 
survey data on traders’ exchange rate forecasts. This has enabled researchers 
to decompose ex post returns into an expected component, the risk premium, 
and an unexpected component, the forecast error. These studies find much 
evidence against REH. The forecast errors are not a white-noise process and 
appear to be correlated with prior information such as the forward rate. Some
^ h is  literature is outlined briefly in the beginning of the chapter. For additional 
surveys see Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996).
of these studies also report little evidence tha t a risk premium accounts for 
movements in expected returns. This has led some to the conclusion that 
risk plays little role and that market participants are grossly irrational, per­
petually forgoing obvious profit opportunities as simplistic as merely betting 
against the forward rate.
I argue in this chapter that
1.) The survey data evidence, when taken as a whole, implies that risk 
does matter. Studies which conclude tha t risk doesn’t m atter pool data 
across exchange rates and time horizons, and do not allow for structural 
change in the relationship. Other studies using un-pooled data and/or allow­
ing for structural change find much evidence of a time-varying risk premium.
2.) The evidence against REH should not be interpreted as implying 
irrationality. Most of these studies do not allow for structural change in the 
correlations between fundamentals and the forecast error. The Contingent 
Expectations Hypothesis (CEH) of Frydman and Goldberg (2013) predicts 
that, given intermittent revisions in forecasting strategies, the relationship 
driving market outcomes in not likely to be time invariant. Testing for such 
parameter instability is an important aspect of determining the robustness 
of any econometric conclusion. If the correlations between fundamentals and 
the forecast error are changing over time, this belies the notion that simple 
profit-generating rules exist and th a t participants are forgoing obvious profit 
opportunities.
3.) Although survey data has been used to test REH, very little research
3
has been conducted with this data to examine the correspondence between 
the ex ante risk component of standard models and the expected returns 
of actual traders. The empirical record implies that allowing for structural 
change will be important here.
4.) Although standard models have not been tested against survey data, 
there is reason from the outset to believe they are deficient. These models 
rely solely on EUT to model preferences and decision making, the predictions 
of which have been found to be grossly inconsistent with subjects’ actual 
behavior towards risk (e.g. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979, 1992) Prospect 
Theory). Progress has been made in developing alternative risk premium 
models, but much of the testing is based on ex post returns, which again 
confounds inference. An open question in the literature remains: which 
model can best account for the ex ante returns of market participants?
5.) One study, Frydman and Goldberg (2007), uses survey data, to test the 
ex ante predictions of their Keynes-Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) 
gap model which draws on the experimental findings of Prospect Theory. 
Extension of this work is warranted in a few directions however. The empir­
ical work on the Keynes-IKE gap model could benefit from improved testing 
to better address non-stationarity and endogeneity, to explicitly test all of 
restrictions imposed on the data, and to better examine the driving and ad­
justment process of the relationship. It would also be of interest to conduct 
nested testing of alternative models, to provide direct individual compar­
isons of alternative theories, as well as to estimate the impact of multiple
4
hypothesized influences on the premium simultaneously.
1.2 T he E arly E m pirical L iterature on  C urrency  R e­
turns
Much of the early empirical work on currency returns was aimed at testing 
the simplest model of ex ante returns, Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP), using 
ex post returns. This condition remains one of the core building blocks of 
the monetary approach to exchange rate determination, which continues to 
play an important role in the literature. UIP is derived under the assump­
tions of EUT and risk neutrality, perfect capital mobility, and homogenous 
expectations. The basic setup starts from a standard investment decision, 
how much of non-monetary wealth one should allocate between domestic and 
foreign assets in their portfolio.
1.2.1 Portfolio Balance under Risk Neutrality
We assume that there are two countries, A (referred to as domestic) and B 
(foreign), and two types of non-monetary assets, A and B bonds. Bonds of 
each type are denominated in the currency of their respective countries. The 
riskless nominal returns to each bond from time t to t+ 1  are denoted by i f  
and i f  respectively. There are no barriers to short selling so individuals can 
issue A and B bonds (borrow domestic and foreign currency, respectively).
5
Using log approximations the ex post nominal return on a pure long position 
in foreign exchange held one period, rf+l:
rf+1 =  s t + 1 -  st +  i f  -  i f  (1)
where st denotes the log level of the time-t spot rate.2The ex post nom­
inal return on a pure short position in foreign exchange rf+l is simply the 
negative of the long position. Equilibrium in the foreign exchange market is 
defined by a balance between the demand for and supply of foreign exchange. 
In deriving the condition for momentary equilibrium, it is assumed that the 
equilibriums in domestic and foreign money markets occur independently of 
the spot-rate process and the level of wealth, and that domestic and foreign 
currency are held only by residents of those countries.3 The first assumption 
implies that equilibrium in the foreign exchange market can be modeled in 
terms of domestic and foreign individuals’ decisions as to how to divide their 
non-monetary wealth between domestic and foreign bonds. The second as­
sumption ensures that whenever an individual alters their portfolio (relative
2 To take a pure long position in foreign exchange for one period, which requires no 
money down at time t, an individual would borrow, say, one unit of domestic currency 
at time t  at a rate of i f , then immediately sell this at A- in the spot market lending ~  
units of foreign currency at i f .  At t  +  1 the individual will sell (1 +  i f)j~L units of foreign 
currency at S(+ i. The return using log approximations yields the above equation.
3Branson and Henderson (1985) include these assumptions in their "basic asset market 
specification".
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holdings of domestic and foreign bonds) they will buy or sell foreign currency..
^t|t+i =  ®t|t+i — s t  +  h  ~  i-t (2)
The assumption of risk neutrality yields a particularly simple portfolio- 
decision rule for all individuals. They are concerned only with the expected 
first moments of returns. Thus individuals’ decision rule is simply to hold 
only the asset with the highest expected return, irrespective of the other 
moments of the returns distribution.. If r\|t+1 > 0 (< 0), an individual would 
want to issue A  bonds (B  bonds) in order to use the proceeds to increase 
their holding of B  (A) bonds without limit. That is:
This incipient capital flow from any expected excess return, given perfect 
capital mobility, would drive down the nominal yield (interest rates) on that 
asset, and bid up its currency value until the expected excess return dis­
appeared. In equilibrium then, UIP implies that expected returns equalize 
across all assets =  0), in which case individuals have no incentive to
purchase or sell foreign exchange in order to alter their portfolio. Another 
way to state this is that in equilibrium any interest rate differential should 
be exactly offset by one-for-one expected depreciation.
1.2.2 Tests of UIP assuming REH
In order to test this proposition (f t|f+i =  0), economists in practice relied on 
the data for ex post returns rt+i, since rt\t+\ is generally unobservable. This
requires one to specify the connection between ex ante and ex post returns, 
or the process for the forecast error, as you will recall from equation (1)
r t + 1 =  ? t \t+ i +  E t+ \-
It was natural for economists to believe that market participants behaved 
in mostly reasonable, rational ways. Consequently, they assumed the forecast 
error was a purely white-noise error, as opposed to assuming some arbitrary, 
yet specific, process of systematic misforecasting. As a result, these tests are 
a joint hypothesis of UIP =  0) and REH {et + 1  -i.i.cl N (0, Q)), yielding
the prediction that r t+1 should be white noise. Obstefeld (1985) examines the 
statistical properties of r t+1 and finds significant evidence th a t it is serially 
correlated. This suggests that, if stable, returns are actually predictable.
An alternative means to indirectly test the implications of UIP with REH 
is to examine whether the interest rate differential (forward discount) is as­
sociated with one-for-one exchange rate deprecation. This is one way to test 
whether returns are in fact white-noise or whether they are correlated with 
time t information (here the forward discount).
A st+k =  a  +  p f t f  +  et+k (3)
where A st+h is the percentage depreciation of the exchange rate over k 
periods (the change in the log of the spot exchange rate), and f p \  is the 
current k-period forward premium (the log of the forward rate minus the log 
of the spot rate). This equation will be referred to as the Bilson-Fama (BF)
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regression. The null hypothesis of unbiasedness is that a  =  0 and /? =  1. 
A finding that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot 
rate implies both REH (white-noise forecast errors) and risk neutrality (or 
less strongly perfect sustitutability between the two countries’ bonds). As 
a result this is sometimes referred to as a test of the risk-neutral, efficient 
markets hypothesis.
Froot (1990) surveys 75 studies testing this hypothesis, all of which reject 
forward rate unbiasedness. Further, the estimate of /? is consistently less 
than one, in fact most are negative indicating that the exchange rate actually 
moves in the opposite direction from that predicted by the forward rate and 
UIP, with an average estimate of -.88. A few are positive but not one has 
a point estimate equal to or greater than one. Although the estimates of a  
themselves are often treated as of secondary importance, they are in several 
instances statistically significant in both Bilson (1981) and Fama (1984). This 
rejection of UIP and REH, if stable, suggests that one could receive an excess 
return on average simply by betting against the forward rate (investing in 
the higher interest rate country). This result became known as the forward 
discount anomaly.
One possible explanation for the bias was that it could arise due to para­
dox noted by Siegel (1972). If Ft is an unbiased estimate of St+ 1 , it is impossi­
ble for 1/Ft to be an unbiased estimate of l/S t+ i since by Jensen’s inequality 
E ( l / S t+i) 7  ^ l / E ( S l+i) due to the convexity of the reciprocal form. Empiri­
cal work by McCulloch (1975) and others however has demonstrated that the
9
Jensen’s inequality term (JIT) is far too small to account for the observed 
bias. Most empirical work following has worked in natural logarithms to 
largely circumvent this issue.
1.2.3 Ambiguity of Interpretation
While researchers typically agree on the presence of the forward rate bias, 
although as discussed momentarily there is reason to believe this bias is not 
uniform over time, there is much contention over its source. Some assume 
that individuals are risk neutral (or rather all risk is diversifiable), and in turn 
the bias would be associated with expectational errors. Bilson (1981) referred 
to this as excessive speculation since, under this interpretation, individuals 
would do better to put a larger weight on the current spot rate than all other 
information in their forecasting strategy.
Others meanwhile assume individuals would not make systematic errors 
over the sample, and in turn view the bias as evidence of a time-varying 
risk premium. There is of course no way to differentiate between these two 
explanations without further information about the expected return, since 
these estimates of a forward discount have been a joint test of both the ex 
ante component (here UIP) and the assumption of white-noise forecast errors 
(REH).
There are statistical issues however which would lead one to question 
whether it is even appropriate to interpret these results as implying pre­
dictable excess returns. Typically the fit of these models is very poor. In
10
Faraa (1984) for example they are typically below 0.1 and never exceed 0.2 
for any of the nine exchange rates examined. Another major issue is that 
the results seem to be sample dependent and subject to structural change. 
Hansen and Hodrick (1983) posited that the process driving flexible exchange 
rates may not have been well understand by market participants in the early 
portion of the samples in the 1970’s, given their recent implementation fol­
lowing the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1973. Both Fama (1984) 
and Lewis (1988) divide their samples into equal length sub-samples (two in 
the case of the former and three in the case of the latter) arriving at rather 
widely differing estimates in each case, though largely negative in Fama’s 
study. Meanwhile, Lewis in her later sub-samples finds evidence of positive 
estimates for /3.
Bekaert and Hodrick (1993) also split their sample for the BF regres­
sion and find negative estimates for j3 in the first half of their sample, and 
largely positive estimates in the second half of their sample. The difference 
appears to be statistically significant based on tests for one predetermined 
break point, though the break was chosen somewhat arbitrarily as the end 
of Bilson’s original sample.Goldberg and Frydman (1996) find parameter in­
stability for the traditional monetary models relating exchange rates and 
fundamentals, using tests which do not pre-specify the number or timing of 
regimes shifts (namely piece-wise linear relationships).
Frydman and Goldberg (2007) also find evidence of parameter instabil­
ity in the BF regression suggesting that the coincidental negative correlation
11
between the forward rate and a future depreciation disappears in alternative 
sub-samples, and in turn there is no reason to expect the profitability of 
betting against the forward rate to hold in the indefinite future, as it has 
often been interpreted. All of this evidence strongly demonstrates the im­
portance of checking and addressing structural change to obtain meaningful 
inference. The forward discount anomaly and the interpretation that it im­
plies gross, timeless irrationality on the part of market participants appear 
to be merely artificats of failing to acknowledge structural change. It also 
suggests a need to depart from the assumption of REH and its presumption 
of a time-invariant conditional probability distribution.
There is also the issue of non-stationarity, which garnered much more 
attention after the Engel and Granger (1987) results on spurious regression 
and cointegration. Non-stationarity of the variables would lead to inconsis­
tent estimates, and thus needs to be sufficiently addressed. Bilson (1981) 
finds significant auto-correlation in three of his nine samples based on the 
Durbin Watson statistics.
The persistence of the exchange rate however is actually a graver issue 
than is commonly recognized, or addressed by the Engel Granger error- 
correction model. Engel and Hamilton (1990) reject a  simple random walk 
model of the exchange rate in favor of a broken trends model(which includes 
a time-varying trend which alternates between positive and negative values 
according to a markov process), suggesting that the changes in the exchange 
rate are actually persistent. Growing evidence demonstrates that the tradi­
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tional univariate tests for unit roots (such as the augmented Dickey-Fueller 
test) have low power to detect an 1(2) component, or stochastic trend, when 
the the noise-to-signal ratio is high, that is the variance of the 1(1) component 
is much larger than that of the 1(2) component. This large noise-to-signal ra­
tio is often found to be the case (Juselius et. al. 2012).4 This issue then likely 
plagues other tests on the persistence, or auto-correlation, of highly volatile 
series, such as the exchange rate or price levels. Alternative multivariate 
tests for 1(2) behavior are advocated as a more powerful and appropriate 
alternative to investigate and detect for time-varying trends.
Others have found non-linearities in terms of threshold effects, wherein 
the exchange rate only tends to mean revert to its "fundamental level" be­
yond some threshold (Taylor, Peel and Sarno 2001). These types of non- 
stationarities imply that the linear BF results are potentially misleading. 
Bailie and Bollerslev (2000) also demonstrate that the anomalous results 
from the BF regression could be due simply to a small sample bias. They 
show in simulation that even if UIP is imposed (a slope coefficient of one 
in the BF regression) that if the volatility is very persistent, the estimate 
will converge to the true value only very slowly. Further, they show that in 
sample sizes typical of the empirical literature, one can arrive at estimates 
similar to those often reported. This provides further motivation for the use 
of survey data on expected returns in that it circumvents some of the added 
volatility in ex post returns, deriving from the additional noise of the forecast
4The broken-trends model is a special case of the more general 1(2) model.
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error.
1.3 T he E xcess R etu rn s P u zz le
The initial rejections of UIP with REH (i.e. forward rate unbiasedness or the 
risk-neutral efficient markets hypothesis) were not immediately devastating 
to the basic tenets of the field. Of course, few economists believed individ­
uals were in fact risk neutral, and this in turn seemed like a very natural 
assumption to modify. There has been an enormous amount of research at­
tempting to account for the reported predictability of returns with an REH 
risk premium model. To see how a risk premium could explain the results 
of the BF regression, consider the "true" model where in equilibrium, any 
expected excess return is attributable to a risk premium:
where rpt is the risk premium, and now it is risk adjusted returns which 
equalize. If the foreign asset is viewed as riskier, there will be an excess return 
on foreign exchange (rpt > 0 ) .  To see how an omitted risk premium could 
bias the BF results, if we assume REH the BF regression instead estimates:
% + 1  ~ st +  i f  - i ?  ~ r p t =  0 (4)
s t |t+ i  — s t  — P { f P t )  +  £ t + i (5)
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a a , cov(fPt,  - rPt) +  cov(fp^,£t+1) 1 _  cov j f r t ,  rpt)
P P + ««r(/rf) «ar(/pf) 1 '
where /d * , the forward discount, is equivalent to the interest rate differen­
tial i f —i f .5 (3 represents the regression estimate of 0, and cov<-fPt ,£t+P
represents the omitted variable bias. Given the assumption of white noise 
forecast errors, cov(fd*, et+\) =  0 , the bias would be the covariance between 
the included regressor, here /p * , and the omitted variable times its coeffi­
cient in the true model (here —rpt), divided by the variance of the included 
regressor. If the forecast error is white noise and individuals are risk neutral, 
the "true" beta would be one. It can be seen then that a covariance between 
the risk premium and forward discount would bias the estimate downward.
Recognition of this potential for a risk premium to account for the ob­
served bias in the forward rate has led to extensive research attempting to 
answer the question "which risk premium model can account for the ex post 
bias of the forward rate?"
1.3.1 The Traditional Capital Asset Pricing Model
The earliest attempts to explain the forward discount anomaly with a risk 
premium adapted the portfolio balance approach or capital asset pricing
’This follows from covered interest parity, otherwise traders could arbitrage the dif­
ference and acquire riskless profits. This condition is widely observed to hold, and many 
banks set their forward contracts to be consistent with prevailing interest rates.
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model (CAPM) to the international context6. As with the derivation of 
UIP, this is a two country, two period setup where individuals allocate their 
non-monetary wealth between country A  bonds, and country B  bonds, both 
of which have random real returns, so as to maximize their next period’s 
expected utility . 7
If the probability distribution of real returns is normal, this implies that 
the distribution can be entirely described by its mean and variance, and 
in turn investors can compare portfolios on the. basis of just their first two 
moments. Risk-averse preferences then are assumed to depend positively 
on the conditional mean of next period’s wealth, /i^t+1and negatively on 
its conditional variance, v^t+1 both of which are implied by the economist’s 
representation of an individual’s forecasting behavior. The utility function 
then
u  =  V(«f,+1,«?«.,), >  o. and < 0 (7)
°n\ t+i ovt\t+\
where the superscript i, denoting that the utility function and conditional 
moments above are for an individual, has been omitted to reduce the nota­
tion.
The next period’s expected real wealth is W^t+l =  Wl+1[a\f\ t^+1 +  (1 +
6See for example Kouri (1976) and Dornbusch (1983) for seminal developments of the 
model.
7 Although the two-period setup is more restrictive than the intertemporal optimizing 
framework, Giovannini and Jorion (1989) show that it is consistent with intertemporal 
optimization if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution equals one.
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i f  — p\)} where j  — A, B  and the remainder are defined as before. Utility 
maximization implies a portfolio share at corresponding to:
at =  —r s r - +  d  where a t  e  [0,1] (8)
P v t \ t + i
where rt\t+i is the conditional mean return and f^+x denotes the condi­
tional variance of the change in the exchange rate Ast+x =  s t + 1  — st , p  denotes 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion implied by the utility function, and d 
denotes the minimum-variance portfolio share of foreign bonds . 8
The expected utility maximizing portfolio share expressed above assumes 
that the rates of domestic and foreign inflation are deterministic, implying 
that Vyt+1 =  v^f+v  We also assume th a t individuals use only their home 
country’s prices to deflate the nominal values. These two assumptions imply 
that the minimum- variance portfolio for all individuals contains bonds issued 
only by their respective countries. This minimum variance portfolio implies 
d =  0 for domestic residents, and d =  1 for foreign residents . 9
By definition then, a domestic individual holds an open position in foreign 
exchange when at ^  0, while a foreign individual holds an open position 
when at ^  1. The solution from the previous equation implies that both 
domestic and foreign wealth holders will want to hold a long position in 
foreign exchange of size (a — d)W  whenever ft\t+i > 0, and a short position
8 See appendix for derivation.
9Lewis (1995) and Engel (1996) also use these assumptions. The assumption of deter­
ministic inflation rates is typically justified by their much lower variance relative to the 
exchange rate, Krugman (1981).
of size — (a—d)W  whenever r t|t+i < 0. Further, the size of one’s open position 
is increasing in the forecasted return, and decreasing with the degree of risk 
aversion and the perceived risk involved, as measured by v ^ +x.
The literature often assumes that market participants have homogenous 
forecasts and preferences. Given these assumptions, the momentary equilib­
rium condition (aggregate bond demands must equal aggregate bond sup­
plies), and the expression for the optimal portfolio share, momentaxy equi­
librium in the foreign exchange market can be expressed as:
h \t+ i =  rpt\t+ i =  p t f t + \ I F P t (9)
where f t|t+i and v^ts+1 are implied by the economist’s specification of the 
common forecasting strategy, IF P t =  t ^  — where and A f  represent 
the total value of each country’s bonds held by non-residents entering time 
t, and Wt =  ^ 2  Wl  is the total non-monetary wealth in both countries. The 
IFPt then is the international financial position of country A vis-a-vis coun­
try B, expressed as a proportion of the total market’s non-monetary wealth. 
If IFPt >  0, country A is a net creditor to country B. This term informs the 
size of the net long position which must be held on foreign exchange (short
if IFPt <  0) •
The above equation, referred to as risk-adjusted uncovered interest parity 
(RAUIP), states that equilibrium occurs when the aggregate, risk-adjusted 
expected returns equalize, that is s^t+1 — st + i f  =  i f  + p v ^ +1I F P t. As can be
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seen, foreign exchange would require an expected excess return in equilibrium 
when the foreign country is a net debtor (IF P t >  0 ), and the market must 
hold a net long position. This equilibrium risk premium depends positively 
on the degree of risk aversion, p, their assessment of the riskiness of holding 
open positions, v ^ +1, and the size of the net long positions which must be 
held, IFPt .
1.3.2 Gross Empirical Inconsistencies of the CAPM
Empirical work testing the CAPM has typically involved estimating versions 
of the above equation for RAUIP with ex post data (assuming REH), and 
evaluating it based on two criteria. The first is to test the implied restriction 
of mean variance optimization against the more general model where the 
coefficient on the IFPt term is an unrestricted, time-varying parameter. A 
second important criteria is to examine the estimates of p. Theory implies 
that it should be positive and statistically significant, but it also needs to 
fall within what is generally regarded as a reasonably low range. Mehra 
and Prescott (1985) for example did not consider estimates higher than 10, 
while others argue a reasonable estimate would be around 2 (Krugman 1981). 
This corresponds to an individual being indifferent between a  4% loss, and a 
gamble equally likely to produce a gain or loss of 2 0 %.
The various studies differ primarily in the way they model v ^ +v  The ear­
liest studies assumed the variance was a constant, while later studies allow
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the variance to vary over time according to  options prices, fundamental vari­
ables, or an auto-regressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) process. 
Engel (1996) summarizes that the performance of the international CAPM 
models has largely been disappointing.
Lewis (1988a) estimates the portfolio balance model assuming a constant 
variance. She uses monthly data on government bond holdings (for the U.S., 
U.K., West Germany, Canada, and Japan), and Eurocurrency rates from 
January 1975 to December 1981. Lewis finds that relative asset supplies 
have little explanatory power for returns. The portfolio balance approach 
implies that an increase in a country’s bonds should lead to a higher return, 
while two of the four estimates are negative.
Engel and Rodriguez (1989) and Giovanni and Jorion (1989) model the 
variance using an ARCH or GARCH model, which assumes the variance of 
the current error term is a function of the size of the previous error term, and 
alternatively allowing it to vary according to other economic data, including 
interest rates. Engel and Rodriguez use monthly data on real returns and 
government bonds for the U.S., France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the U.K. 
from April 1973 to December 1984. Giovanni and Jorion use weekly data 
on nominal returns and government bonds of the U.S., Germany, the U.K., 
and Switzerland, and also the U.S. stock market, from July 1974 to Decem­
ber 1986. Both studies find that the estimates of p (estimated for multiple 
country’s bonds) are either insignificantly different from zero, or negative 
(whereas it should be positive in the model), and the restrictions of CAPM
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are all strongly restricted.
Lyons (1988) allows the variance to vary, but measures the conditional 
variance by backing it out of options prices. Estimation is conducted for the 
mark, yen and pound rates with the US dollar, using monthly da ta  on returns 
and asset values from April 1983 to December 1985. Again the estimates of 
<j> are not significant, and in fact the point estimates are negative. Thomas 
and Wickens (1993) include data on equities as well as bonds to represent 
asset supplies for Japan, Germany, the U.S. and the U.K. from June 1976 to 
December 1987. The estimates of 4> are actually statistically significant but 
negative, and the CAPM restrictions are rejected.
One possibility is that the empirical applications of the CAPM have sim­
ply failed to input the relevant conditional volatility. An alternative to the 
GARCH models has been further developed and more commonly employed 
in recent years, referred to as realized volatility. The realized measures use 
intra-period observations to construct a measure of the variance, rather than 
assuming it is a function of the previous observations of the error term as 
in the ARCH models. For example to construct a daily measure, intra-day 
tick data would be employed, or to construct a monthly measure the data 
on daily returns would be used to calculate the realized monthly series. 10 
This unconditional calculation has been shown to be an unbiased and highly 
efficient estimator of volatility. Employing a realized measure to evaluate the
10See French, Schwert and Stambaugh 1987 for monthly measures, and Andersen, Boller- 
slev, Diebold and Labys 2003, and Berndorff-Nielsen and Shephard 2002 for daily mea­
sures.
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CAPM in foreign exchange is a potentially fruitful avenue for future research 
extensions.
There is another aspect in which the international CAPM is more funda­
mentally inconsistent with the behavior of returns. The excess return, both 
ex post as well as ex ante measures based on regression estimates, undergo 
frequent sign reversals. Lews (19995) for example uses the BF regression and 
Mark and Wu (1998) use a bivariate vector auto-regression to estimate the 
premium. In both cases, the series demonstrate quite frequent sign reversals. 
This can only occur in the CAPM when countries alter from net debtor to 
net creditor, which occurs very seldomly.
1.3.3 The Consumption Capital Asset Pricing M odel
A popular avenue attempting to explain the forward discount anomaly via 
an REH risk premium has focused on the connection between returns and 
consumption, referred to as the consumption CAPM (or CCAPM ) . 11 The 
important feature of preferences in the model is that the marginal rate of 
substitution for consumption varies inversely with consumption growth; that 
is when consumption is high, i t ’s marginal utility is low. As a result, an 
asset which payoffs in bad states (low consumption) would be valued more 
heavily all else equal, while an asset with pro-cyclical payoffs (coinciding 
with good states where consumption is high) would then require a premium
n The discussion in this section follows Engel (1996) and Mark (2001). See therein for 
further details.
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in equilibrium. In this model, risk is solely connected to this covariance 
between pays off and consumption. If the covariance is zero (or viewed to be 
zero), no premium would exist in equilibrium, as idiosyncratic risk (variance) 
is not priced in the model.
In applied asset pricing research, per capita consumption is often used. 
This can be justified by assuming the utility function in the Lucas two- 
period model is homothetic and that the relative price of home and foreign 
goods (the real exchange rate) is constant. While the latter assumption in 
particular is false, it allows one to derive more easily the basic conclusions of 
the model concerning a connection between the premium and the covariance 
between returns and consumption growth. The use of this assumption in 
empirical work however does appear dubious. The more general case will be 
discussed in subsequent sections. This assumption enables one to write the 
representative agent’s marginal rate of substitution between t  and t +  1 as:
where U'(Ct) is the marginal utility of consumption evaluated at equi­
librium, and /3 is the subjective discount factor. A speculative position in 
the forward market requires no payment at time t. If the agent is behaving 
optimally, the expected marginal utility of further speculation will be zero, 
that is Et [ U'(Ct+i)(Ft — St+i)/Pt+i}- This Euler equation, the first-order 




The motivation for this rearrangement is in part said to be the need for 
an expression in terms of stationary random variables, so the conditional and 
unconditional variances and covariances between them exist. It is worth not­
ing however that the observables variables in the expression however (prices, 
future exchange rates, and the forward rate) are often found to be non- 
stationary using multivariate tests (Juselius 2006).
We can then exploit the property of the covariance decomposition
equation (16) that the first term on the right-hand side of the covariance 
decomposition will equal zero and we can rearrange to obtain:
Covt {Xt+ lYt+l) =  Et (Xt + u Yt+1) -  Et(Xt+1)Et (Yt+1) (12)
If we substitute X l+1 =  fit+l and Yt+\ (Ft -St+i )Pt+i , we can see from
& [(F , -  S m V P w .,] =  Ccm‘l m  S w ) / p w ) , ^ +1] (13)
Z'tWt+l)
This condition states that the expected forward payoff is inversely pro­
portional to the conditional covariance between the payoff and the marginal
rate of substitution (the latter of which varies inverslely with consumption 
growth). The factor of proportionality is — 1 /E t (nt+1) which is the expected 
gross real interest rate multiplied by —1 .
Let’s begin by focusing on the interpretation Under the case where Et[(Ft— 
St+i ) / Pt+i] < 0. This implies two things. Firstly that individuals expect to 
make an excess return by holding a long position in foreign currency, (bor­
rowing in the forward market and selling in the spot market at t + 1 , or bor­
rowing home currency and lending uncovered in the foreign currency). Thus 
since foreign exchange is garnering a premium, it in equilibrium must be the 
riskier asset. Secondly, we can see that the covariance on the right-hand side 
is positive. The high payoffs occur when (Ft — St+i ) / P t + 1 < 0 so these states 
are associated with low values of /q+1, which occurs when consumption is 
high. Risk-averse investors however would prefer an asset that tends to pay 
off when consumption is low (since the marginal utility is higher). Since the 
payoff is procyclical, investors require a premium to hold foreign exchange in 
this case.
Since the foreign asset is riskier, the home asset must be safer. Given 
Et[(Ft — 5t+i) /P t+i] < 0, you expect to experience a loss by holding a long 
position in the domestic asset. This may seem in conflict with logic, holding 
an asset one expects to lose money on, however given it tends to pay off 
when consumption is low (fj,t+1 is high), the marginal utility of the payoff in 
terms of consumption is greater. The expected loss then can be viewed as a
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consumption insurance premium . 12
1.3.4 Gross Empirical Inconsistencies of the CCAPM
Mark (1985) provides the first study to estimate an equation similar to (12). 
In it he assumes constant relative risk aversion. Mark estimates the Euler 
equation using Hansen and Singleton’s (1982) Generalized Method of Mo­
ments (GMM) technique. GMM allows one to test the implications of the 
model without requiring as much information. Typically the focus is on the 
first order conditions, for example the Euler equation, which holds even if 
we do not know the process driving the shocks.The objective is to estimate 
the coefficient of relative risk aversion p to, as in the CAPM, see if its es­
timate is positive, significant, and reasonable. The empirical tests on the 
Euler equation also evaluate the given orthogonality conditions. The Euler 
equation provides a necessary condition, so while failing to reject it may not 
imply that the model is consistent with the data in all respects, a rejection 
is sufficient to determine that the theory needs modification.
The model in Mark (1985) is estimated jointly for the Canadian dollar, 
mark, guilder and pound exchange rates with the U.S. dollar. Mark uses 
monthly data from March 1973 to July 1983, and aggregate per capita con­
sumption (adjusted by monthly population estimates) measured as both non­
durables, and non-durables and services. He uses the consumption deflator
12If individuals are risk neutral, the marginal rate of substitution is constant, and since 
the covariance with a constant is zero, the Euler equation reduces to E t ( F t / P t + i )  =  
Et{St+i/Pt+\)-
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as the measure of prices.
To condense the problem, let r t+i be the 4 x 1  vector of forward foreign 
exchange returns for the four exchange rates examined
<+1 =  [ (F u -S u+i ) / (S lt), (F2t- S 2t+l) / ( S 2t), (F3tS 3t+l) / ( S 3t), (F3t—S3t+i) / (S3t)]
(14)
and let Mt+\ be the 4 x 1  vector Mt+1 =  /it+1r t + 1 where p t+l is the in­
tertemporal marginal rate of substitution for the home representative investor 
under CRRA utility, U(C) =  C 1~p/ ( l —p), which would be /3(Ct+i /C t )1~p(Cxt /C xt+i) 
where the subscript x denotes home country goods. W ith the Euler equation 
we get
E[Mt+i\It] =  0 (15)
- We can divide both sides by j3 so only p needs to be estimated, and 
the above equation states that Mt+\ should be uncorrelated with any time t 
information (that is there are no risk-adjusted excess returns, risk-adjusted as 
defined by the CCAPM). In order to test this, let zt be a fc-dimensional vector 
of available time t "instrumental variables". This allows one to construct a 
system of 3 x k equations to estimate and test
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The question then becomes which variables to use as instruments. Mark 
(2 0 0 1 ) notes that it is not a good idea to include too many variables, as 
the estimation will lose feasibility and the small sample properties will be 
harmed. A natural selection is to use the forward discount, due to its direct 
relevance to the puzzle a t hand. One needn’t use all orthogonality conditions, 
so to further reduce the problem let for each currency i
(17)
y {Fit -  Sit) / S it j
Mark then estimates the system of equations. His findings are emblem­
atic of subsequent studies. The estimates for the coefficient of relative risk 
aversion <f> are far larger than what is typically viewed as plausible, in cases 
exceeding 40. The restrictions are also rejected, tha t is the residuals (risk- 
adjusted excess returns) are not orthogonal to the information set, but rather 
forecastable from the forward discount.
Several studies update and expand upon Mark (1985). Hodrick (1989b) 
uses quarterly data on seven U.S. dollar and British pound exchange rates 
from 1973:3 to 1987:4 with the mark, pound, Canadian dollar, Belgian franc,
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French franc, guilder, and Swiss franc. For the U.S. exchange rates the 
consumption measure is for non-durables and services, while for the U.K. ex­
change rates it is non-durables alone. He does not reject the over-identifying 
restrictions in either case, but the estimate of p for the US data is 60.9, 
though it is a quite reasonable 2.15 with the U.K. data.
Modjtahedi (1991) conducts a study similar to Mark (1985), but testing 
the entire term structure of available forward rates (one-, three-, six-, and 
twelve-month maturities). The data is monthly from July 1973 to July 1988 
for the pound, Canadian dollar, mark and yen relative to the dollar. Fol­
lowing Mark again, Modjtahedi uses both consumption of non-durables, and 
nondurables and services. The model is similarly rejected, and the lagged 
forward discounts appear to have explanatory power.
Kaminsky and Peruga (1990) use a sample for the mark, yen and pound 
with the U.S. dollar on monthly data from April 1975 to June 1985, with U.S. 
expenditure on non-durables plus services, and the consumption deflator. 
Under rational expectations the forward rate bias can be written as:
4t-i -  ft =  - ^ U a r t ( ^ +1) +  Covt {sPt+i,Pt+i)  +  pCovt (4 + i,  <h+1) +  4+1 ( 18)
for each currency j .  They then stack the currencies into a vector, along 
with consumption and prices, which Kaminsky and Peruga write as:
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zt+ 1  — Po +  Pi(L)zt +  Dovec(Ht+i ) +  vt+i (19)
where z't+1 =  [ct+1 -  Ct, pt+1 - p t , (st+i -  f t )BP, (sm  -  f t )GM, (st+i -  / t ) ^ ]
(20)
i / t+i is the covariance matrix of the vector of errors vt+\, which is modeled 
as a vector version of Bollerslev’s (1986) GARCH model. They then estimate 
the model with maximum likelihood according to the implied restrictions and 
find an estimate of p =  372.4, though with a standard error of 274.2 (note 
the likelihood ratio test rejects p — 0, contrary to the Wald test results). 
While the restrictions of a coefficient of -1/2 and 1 on the variance and 
covariance between the exchange rate and prices respectively is not rejected, 
the estimated residuals are not orthogonal to all time t information, rather 
they are forecastable using the forward discount.
Mark (2001) provides some intuition for the large estimates of p by refor­
mulating it into a stanard regression. Consider the case for a single currency. 
If [Ct/C t+i ,P t/P t+i, (Ft -  St+i ) / S t) are jointly log-normal then Mt+1 is also 
log-normally distributed. Taking logs we can write the regression equation 
as
pln( — -■--) +  In M t + 1  +  £t+ 1  (21)
'-'t+it+i
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The estimates under OLS would be inconsistent since both right-hand 
side regressors are correlated, but with instrumental variables, as in GMM, 
the estimates would regain consistency. This illustration demonstrates that 
the large estimate of p arises due to the high variability in excess returns, and 
the low variability in consumption growth. This then requires small changes 
in consumption to map into large changes in returns (a large coefficient) 
for a given R-squared and returns series. This puzzle is typically phrased 
as consumption not being variable enough to account for returns without 
implausible estimates of risk aversion. The models are estimated assuming 
the future values for the spot rate, prices, and consumption are known with 
perfect foresight (up to a random error). To emphasize again the ambiguity 
due to the joint hypothesis of REH though, it could be the issue is not 
consumption growth having too low of variability, but rather ex post returns 
are too variable of a proxy for ex ante returns.
1.3.5 A Generalization to Consumption Durability and Habit Per­
sistence
Backus, Gregory and Telmer (1993) adapt a variant of the CCAPM to the 
context of the foreign exchange market . 13 This model allows for the possibil­
ity of habit persistence (higher consumption in the previous period requires
13Early applications of this variant of the CCAPM to address the equity premium puzzle 
can be found in Nason (1988), Sundaresan (1989), Abel (1990), and Constantinides (1990). 
The excess returns puzzle with currencies though focuses not on the mean returns of one 
asset over another (e.g. stocks over bonds), but rather their fluctuations (e.g. changes in 
excess returns of one country’s bond over another).
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higher consumption this period to maintain the same utility) or durability 
(consumption in previous periods adds to utility in the current period). In 
their model, utility is not separable over time but is of the form of constant 
relative risk aversion
where d* =  c* -  rjct_i
When 77 (referred to as the habit parameter, since it defines the intertem­
poral non-separability of utility) > 0  there is habit persistence, meaning 
higher current consumption requires higher future consumption to maintain 
future utility. When 77 < 0 consumption is durable such that current con­
sumption adds to future utility. Their data set employs monthly U.S. dollar 
exchange rate data from July 1974 to April 1990 with the Canadian dollar, 
French franc, mark and yen. Consumption is measured as U.S. expenditure 
on nondurables and services, excluding clothing and medical care, and the im­
plicit consumption deflator is used to measure prices. The forward discounts, 
and lags of consumption growth and inflation are used as instruments.
Backus, Gregory and Telmer follow Mark’s use of GMM to estimate the 
Euler condition which in this case is formulated as:
Ut =  E t [ J 2 P kU{dt4.k)] (22)
E \th+ir t+i] =  0 (23)
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where pt+1 =  (1 -  0rj) l [fddt pl -  P2vdt p2}{pt/ p t+1) /d t p (24)
Backus, Gregory and Telmer first estimate the model imposing rj =  0, 
corresponding to Mark’s earlier work, so =  q . They again find very large 
estimates for p (> 50). When they allow for persistent effects of consump­
tion, they find that r) <  0, implying a higher value for p, which indeed is 
estimated at over 100. In order to determine the source of the rejection, the 
authors calibrate a model attempting to select values for the parameters to 
correspond to the moments of the forward discount and returns data. The 
major difficulty it appears is in producing a model which is simultaneously 
compatible with the high serial correlation found in the forward discount, and 
the high variance of returns, the latter of which again could be a by-product 
of using ex post returns to proxy for ex ante.
As Engel (1996) concludes the overall deduction from the studies using 
consumption data is that the models do not work very well. Consumption 
generally does not vary enough to account for the high variation in ex post 
returns on foreign exchange without extremely large (and thus generally re­
garded as implausible) degrees of relative risk aversion. The models are also 
found to be inconsistent with the predictive power of the forward rate. Again 
though the tests of both the CAPM and CCAPM models are suspect, since 
the modeling generally assumes parameter stability, stationarity, and white- 
noise forecast errors, which could potentially invalidate any inference, and
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which have been ubiquitously rejected when explicitly tested14.
1.4 D o  w e need  an A ltern a tiv e  M od el o f  th e  R isk  P re­
m ium  or F orecasting?
As with the previous tests of UIP, the difficulties encountered by the canonical 
models cannot be directly traced to the modeling of the ex ante component 
without further information, since the empirical work constitutes a joint hy­
pothesis about both risk behavior (ffjt+i) and forecasting (et+i). Recall the 
Bilson-Fama regression.
In order to unravel the source of the forward discount bias, Froot and 
Frankel (1989) make use of survey data on traders’ actual exchange rate 
forecasts to proxy s®+1. This allows one to decompose the forward rate bias, 
or the deviation from the null hypothesis that 0 = 1 ,  into a component 
attributable to expectational errors, and another attributable to a risk pre­
mium. The probability limit of the coefficient 0  is
14The case of the latter (tests of white-noise forecast errors) will be discussed in the 
following section.
A st+k =  a  +  0  fpt  +  et+k (25)
P =
Cov(Et+k, fP t)  +  Cov(As*+k, f t f )  




Where Asf+fc is the expected depreciation, as measured by the median 
survey response, and s t+k is the expectational error of the median forecast. 
By taking the definition of the risk premium f t|t+1 =  fd^ — Asf+fc and rewrit­
ing in terms of (3 equals one minus a term arising from the risk premium and 
one from a failure of REH. j3 =  1 — brp — bre where
With the use of survey data both of these terms are observable. A result 
that bre — 0 would suggest that forecast errors over the sample are uncorre­
lated with the forward discount, while brp =  0 would suggest that the risk 
premium is uncorrelated with the forward discount. The magnitude of bre 
is generally much larger, sometimes by an order of magnitude. Further, the 
sign of brp is in some cases negative, suggesting that the risk premium actu­
ally tends to push the bias in the opposite direction, to an estimate of beta 
larger than one. In order to evaluate whether these estimates are statistically 
significant, Froot and Frankel test a few competing hypotheses.
Var(rt]t+1) +  Cov(ft]t+1, A ste+fc) 
V ar( fp t )
(27)
- C o v { e t+k, f P t ) (28)
V ar( fp t )
A s et+k =  & +  Pf Pt (29)
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The above equation represents, a direct test of UIP, as opposed to the 
ex post tests which are more accurately a  test of forward rate unbiasedness. 
The error term now is interpreted as the measurement error of the survey 
data (in proxying the relevant aggregate market belief). The null hypothesis 
that the risk premium is uncorrelated with the forward discount is 0  =  1, 
given 0 = 1  — brp. In order to fully test UIP a  =  0 would also have to hold. 
In seven of the nine cases, they cannot reject that the estimate of 0  =  1, 
implying that the risk premium is not statistically significant. In the other 
two cases, it appears that the risk premium accounts for more than 100% 
of the bias, and in the other the risk premium is negative indicating that it 
actually pushes the bias in the other direction, above one, accounting for a 
negative percentage of the bias.
Froot and Frarikel consistently find a large constant term in the regression 
(rejecting the null of a  =  0 at less than .1% significance levels in all cases). 
This suggests that individuals are not risk neutral as implied by UIP. This 
term should not be interpreted as implying a constant risk premium however, 
but rather a large average level of the premium over the sample which in their 
study appears to be largely uncorrelated with the forward discount. If one 
wanted to test the proposition that the premium could be represented as a 
constant over the sample, tests for cointegration would be necessary to see 
if the deviations from equation (29) were stationary or persistent (this is 
conducted in chapter two).
In order to test whether prediction errors account for the forward bias,
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Froot and Frankel run the test of excessive speculation discussed by Bilson. 
This stringent test of REH asks whether investors would do better to place 
more or less weight on the spot rate rather than all other variables in their 
information set.10 The null hypothesis is that a  =  0,/3 =  0. The error term 
is the measurement error of the surveys minus the unexpected change in the 
spot rate. This allows one to test whether the estimates of bre are statistically 
significant, since the coefficient /? here is exactly equal to bre.
■^st+k ~ &-st+k =  & +  PfPt +  +£t+k (30)
Indeed, in all cases bTe > 0 corresponding to excessive speculation, and 
is precisely estimated. Bachetta, Mertens and Van Wincoop (2006) also find 
that the predictability of returns in equities, foreign exchange, and bond 
markets appear related to expectational errors. Using survey data they find 
that the same variables which predict expectational errors, generally predict 
excess returns. They do not however examine the properties of the risk 
premium and its connection to excess returns.
l0Froot and Frankel (1985,1987) and Dominguez (1986) also test for biasedness in survey
data.
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1.4.1 Rethinking the Conclusion: Risk may M atter while Irra­
tionality May Not
Some have used this seminal finding of Froot and Frankel to argue in favor 
of explanations for excess returns based solely on pure irrationality.16 By 
pure irrationality would be the view that there are obvious, profits to be 
made from simply betting against the forward rate and market participants 
are merely unaware of this regularity, thereby perpetually forgoing obvious 
profit opportunities If true this would represent a truly gross form of market 
inefficiency.
The first issue to note though is tha t Froot and Frankel pooled their data 
across exchange rates (for the same source and time horizon of the data), 
which implicitly assumes the relationship is the same for all exchange rates 
within each set. Other studies which use alternative samples, and unpooled 
data (using bilateral exchange rates) find evidence both of violations of REH 
(as do Froot and Frankel 1989) and a time-varying risk premium (Cavaglia, 
Verschoor, and Wolff 1994, and Chinn and Frankel 1994, 2000).When taken 
as a whole then, the survey data  literature suggests that risk does matter.
As a demonstartion of the obscuring effects of pooling the data across 
exchange rates, presented below are a subset of Cavaglia, Verschoor’s and 
Wolff’s results using bilateral data, which we can then contrast with the 
results using pooled data. The chi-squared statistic is the test of perfect
16See the section "Explanations based on non-REH forecasting and Microstructure" for 
further discussion of this literature
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substitutability, the joint hypothesis that a  =  0 and /3 =  0 in A sf+k =  
a  + 13 f p t + e t+k■ One can see that the bilateral results reject the null in three 
of four cases at the 5% level (indicated by the *) and in two cases at the 1% 
level (indicated by the **), and yet the pooled results do not.






While these later results draw into question Froot and Frankel’s conclu­
sion concerning the empirical relevance of a time-varying premium (or the 
lack thereof), they were very careful to note that their results only conclu­
sively demonstrate that the common practice of using ex post data to infer 
about ex ante expectations is likely to be misleading. They acknowledge 
that their results may not imply "obvious irrationality" (agents systemati­
cally forgoing obvious profit, or even utility increasing opportunities). They 
remark that this result could be due to the well-known peso problem, the 
possibility of a large devaluation which simply has not occurred within the 
sample.
Another alternative they cite is that there could be changes in the process 
governing the spot rate, related to the parameter instability discussed pre­
viously with regard to the results on forward rate biasedness. Frydman and
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Goldberg (1996) and other studies find evidence of such structural change 
in the monetary models of the exchange rate. Frydman and Goldberg’s con­
tingent market hypothesis argues that, given the openness of the world and 
non-routine change, market participants are likely to alter their forecast­
ing strategies at least intermittently over time in ways th a t cannot be pre­
specified in advance, which itself is likely to engender change in the process 
driving market outcomes. If the relationship between returns and the forward 
rate is changing over time, this would belie the interpretation that market 
participants are foregoing obvious profit opportunities to be made simply by 
betting against the forward rate The survey data  results implying irrational­
ity have not explicitly tested for parameter stability, which is an important 
aspect of verifying the robustness of any empirical conclusion, and in turn 
must be regarded with a degree of skepticism. Indeed, a quite recent working 
paper, Frydman, Goldberg, and Kozlova (2013) finds evidence of parameter 
instability in the correlation between the forecast error and the forward rate, 
where it actually reverses sign in certain sub-samples. This evidence strongly 
refutes the interpretation of obvious irrationality.
Another issue is that the persistence of the variables has also not been 
suitably addressed, which may cause the results to be inconsistent. More­
over, even if UIP appears to "hold" ex ante (based on the survey data) with 
a coefficient indistinguishable from unity (which it actually does not once 
using unpooled data), the deviations from the estimated relationship may be 
persistent, meaning it should not be interpreted as an equilibrium relation­
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ship. Persistent deviations from the relationship would suggest that either 
the measurement error is not white-noise, and/or there is a time-varying 
(non-stationary) risk premium, though a coefficient of untiy would imply 
that the time-varying risk premium could not account for the forward bias.
1.4.2 An Omission in the Literature
While the findings of non white noise forecast errors suggest a  need to revise 
the specification of forecasting, and the presence of a risk premium suggests 
that risk does matter, the existing literature has not answered the question of 
whether any of the extant models can account for movements in the risk pre­
mium. In other words, they have not tested whether the traditional models 
can account for the risk preferences of actual traders which we have observed 
directly through the expected excess return in survey data. One possibility 
is that the time-varying risk premium, even if non-stationary, may simply be 
a persistent measurement error, in that we of course only have a sample of 
traders. Consequently the finding of a time-varying risk premium may not 
fully invalidate the hypothesis tha t relative returns equalize ex ante for the 
market in aggregate. If, however, we can connect the sampled risk premium 
to some risk factor, we can be much more confident in our interpretation that 
it represents a genuine risk premium.
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1.5 E xp erim en ta l E v id en ce  on  R isk  P referen ces
Given the finding of a time-varying risk premium, it is im portant to determine 
which model(s) can account for its behavior and to what extent. While 
the canonical models have not been tested on the basis of ex ante survey 
data to see whether they can account for the behavior of actual market 
participants, there is much experimental evidence that EUT is inconsistent 
with individuals’ preferences towards gambles. EUT, at least on its own, is 
thus liable to provide a faulty foundation for our models of the risk premium. 
A classic example of the type of risk averse behavior theory aims to explain 
was provided by Samuelson. An individual is given the option to accept 
or decline the following gamble: one which is equally likely to pay $110 or 
cost you $100, denoted as ($110, .5; -$100, .5), so a simple flip of the coin for 
example where heads pays you $110, and tails loses you $100. Despite the fact 
that this is a positive expected value gamble bet ($110 * .5 — $100 * .5 =  $5), 
individuals will often forego the bet in favor of the lower expected value, but 
certain, payoff- of zero.
It may seem surprising that we need to depart from EUT in order to 
explain such behavior. Rabin (2000) demonstrated however that we cannot 
interpret aversion to small positive EV bets in the framework of EUT without 
leading to implausible conclusions. He provided a non-parametric theorem 
that demonstrated that if an expected utility maximizer rejects the above 
gamble, they would also reject the gamble lose $1000 half of the time, and win
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any sum of money the other half of the time ($0 0 , .5; —$1000, .5)! Certainly 
this seems like an implausible degree of risk aversion. The intuition of the 
result is quite simple, given a smooth, increasing, concave function in final 
wealth, if an individual is willing to forego the first bet, this must imply a 
high degree of risk aversion and an extremely concave utility function. In 
turn, given this high degree of concavity, the individual must be extremely 
risk averse to large potential losses, such as the loss of $1000.
There are other features of individual behavior towards gambles which 
contradict the predictions of EUT. A well-known example from Kahneman 
and Tversky’s work depends on two sets of decisions. In the first, assume in 
addition to whatever you own you are given $1000. Now you must choose 
between A) a guaranteed pay-off of $500, and B) a gamble which is equally 
likely to pay $1000, and $0 ($1000, .5; $0, .5). Individuals usually select option 
A) given this choice, which coincides with the standard understanding of risk 
averse behavior. In the second, set of options, now pretend th a t in addition 
to whatever you own that you are given $2000.
Now you must select between C) a guaranteed loss of $500 and D) a 
gamble which is equally likely to lose $1000 and $0 (—$1000, .5; $0, .5). In 
this case however individuals often select option D, which would imply risk- 
seeking behavior under the standard interpretation of EUT. Note that the 
two sets of options (A and B, and C and D) are identical in terms of the 
levels of final (expected) wealth, and yet individuals often select differently. 
This example, when combined with Samuelsoh’s example, highlights the type
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of behavior Prospect Theory attem pts to formalize in as parsimoniously as 
possible.
It appears that the framing of the question, whether in terms of gains 
or losses, alters the response. This suggests that individuals are reference 
dependent, evaluating outcomes in terms of gains or losses relative to some 
reference level, typically discussed as the status quo or initial level of wealth 
though the exact reference level may depend on the context. This is in 
contrast to expected utility theory, where the final level of wealth is all that 
matters in the evaluation of utility. Of course, a simple example would 
suggest that two people, even with identical preferences and wealth, may not 
have the same utility. Consider two individuals with $1,000,000 in wealth, 
if for example one individual previously had wealth of $100,000 and the 
other wealth of $10,000,000, they would likely have quite differing levels of 
contentment from now possessing $1,000,000, the former having experienced 
a large gain likely being quite ecstatic, while the former having experienced 
a large loss may be quite disgruntled.
This type of perception in terms of changes from recent conditions, rather 
than in terms of absolute levels, is actually a very natural by-product of adap­
tation and is consistent with the way we perceive a wide range of phenomena. 
Consider for instance the way you respond to temperature, sound, or bright­
ness. The second feature of Prospect Theory is designed to capture aversion 
to small expected value bets, coined loss aversion, whereby the disutility of 
a loss is greater than the utility from an equal magnitude gain, usually on
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the order of greater than 2:1. The last feature of prospect theory is dimin­
ishing sensitivity to both gains and losses, which would explain the finding 
that individuals were risk averse over large gains (since a gain of $1000 is not 
twice as valued as a gain of $500) and risk seeking over large losses (since 
the loss of $1000 would be less than twice as painful as the loss of $500). 
These features can be represented with a Prospect Utility function, called 
the value function as in Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1992). We have the 
value depending on gains and losses, in a piece wise fashion with a larger 
weight on losses, and concavity in gains and convexity in losses.
v( AW)  =  ( A W ) a if A W  h  0 
v(AW)  =  —A ( A W)P if A W  >- 0 where A >- 1 implies loss aversion
In formulating the utility function representation of their experimental 
results, Kahneman and Tversky assume that the exponents on the change in 
wealth (the curvatures) are equal in both gains and losses (a =  f3), though 
the results could also be consistent with (a <  /3).
Recall that in the work of Rabin (2000) interpreting behavior towards 
gambles in light of EUT led to implausible degrees of risk aversion. Sim­
ilarly, attempts to explain the premium in asset markets in light of EUT 
leads to implausible degrees of risk aversion. Prospect theory meanwhile is 
able to provide an explanation for the experimental evidence on individuals’
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behavior towards risk. Perhaps then applying prospect theory will be able 
to help in resolving the excess returns puzzle. A major difficulty in applying 
prospect theory to financial markets is in specifying how individuals fore­
cast the potential loss, as opposed to the experimental settings where this 
is given, in addition to the previously emphasized difficulty of representing 
how individuals form their point forecasts of the expected return.
1.6 A ltern ative  M od els o f  th e  P rem iu m
Several models of the premium have been developed on the basis of prospec­
tive utility preferences, in conjunction with other specifications of decision­
making in financial markets. Barberis, Huang and Santos (2000), hereafter 
BHS, use a mixed approach of both EUT and loss aversion to match the 
historical premium on equities over government bonds, and other stylized 
facts including the volatility and predictability of returns.17 This suggests a 
potential benefit from integrating EUT and prospect theory. They also use 
another finding from psychology concerning the way individuals’ preferences 
towards risk evolve over time based on previous performance. It has been 
found that prior gains tend to cushion the pain of subsequent losses, produc­
ing less loss averse behavior and vice versa for previous losses (Thaler and 
Johnson 1990).
17 BHS draws from the earlier application of loss aversion by Benartzi and Thaler (1995) 
to create a dynamic model.
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BHS depart from the CCAPM by assuming that individuals get utility 
not just from consumption, but also from the gain or loss in wealth. In turn, 
the representative agent will maximize:
+  btpt+1v(A W t+1))} (32)
Where all symbols are as before, though A W t+\ is related to the return 
on risky investments, and bt is a scaling factor proportional to  aggregate per 
capita consumption, which determines the weight attached to investment 
aside from its impact on consumption. Returns are assumed to be evaluated 
relative to the reference level of the risk free rate. For tractiability, BHS 
ignore the non-linearity of prospect theory, which they justify by noting that 
the results from Benartzi and Thaler (1995) find that most of Prospect The­
ories ability to match the excess returns puzzle in equities comes from loss 
aversion, while the non-linearities appear to be rather unimportant to the 
results.
t>(AW) =  A W  if A W  >■ 0 
V '  “  (33)
v(A W )  =  —AAW if A W  < 0 where A y  1 implies loss aversion
The model also employs both loss aversion and risk aversion, in order to 
account for limits to speculation, which suggests that perhaps both effects 
are of relevance for understanding returns.
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The initial empirical work on the BHS house-money- effect model was 
based on REH and calibration, using the prospect theory estimates of A =  
2.25, in an attempt to match the historical excess return of equities over 
government bonds. The literature on the analogous puzzle in the foreign 
exchange market however is focused instead on changes in excess returns 
over time, and as such it would be desirable to evaluate this model in the 
foreign exchange market on the basis of its ability to match the time path of 
excess returns.
A key feature of the model is that the degree of loss aversion depends on 
previous performance, such that a previous gain reduces loss aversion while 
vice versa for a gain. W ithout this BHS are unable to generate the sizable 
premium typically observed, regardless of the evaluation period used.
The importance of the evaluation period is that, given equity prices are 
more variable, a shorter time horizon would imply more observations of losses 
over a given period, which are weighted more heavily given loss aversion, and 
thus a lower prospective utility over any given period the more frequent the 
evaluation of gains and losses. Benartzi and Thaler (1995) estimated an eval­
uation period of approximately one year, which they argue is consistent with 
tax filings and the fact various funds and pensions provide their most com­
prehensive reports on an annual basis. In order to generate a large premium, 
returns need an additional source of volatility. The dynamic loss aversion 
implies that when dividends increase, and the price increases, loss aversion 
decreases causing an additional increase in the price. In order to model the
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effect of prior outcomes, they introduce a benchmark price, here referred to 
as which can be thought of as a second reference level.The only restric­
tion placed on S^71 is that it moves more gradually than the price itself (less 
than one-for-one). Loss aversion then is related to deviation of the price St 
from its benchmark level, specified in ratio form St/Sf™. By calibrating the 
parameter relating loss aversion inversely to prior outcomes they are able to 
match the volatility of equity prices and the mean historical premium, the 
high volatility of equity prices, and the predictability of returns based on 
price-to-dividends ratios.
A second model which uses a variant of PT  comes from Frydman and 
Goldberg (2003, 2007), hereafter FG, called the Keynes- imperfect knowl­
edge economics (IKE) gap model. Recall that in Kahneman and Tversky’s 
formulation, it was assumed that the curvature in gains and losses was equal. 
In general though, the degree of loss aversion would be
A =  \ {W \a r l\Y~a (34)
Where W\a\ is the position size and r l is the forecasted potential loss 
(the mean from the loss portion of the forecasted distribution of returns) on 
a unit position. Only in the special case where (3 =  a  does the degree of loss 
aversion reduce to the constant A. The experimental results however could 
also be consistent with /3 > a. In this case, for a given r l, the degree of loss 
aversion will increase with the size of one’s position. Since individuals select
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their position size, FG refer to this as endogenous loss aversion. In order to 
ensure that A > 1 over the domain of losses, they alter the representation of 
the degree of loss aversion to be:
A =  Ai +  \ \ { W \a r l\ f - a (35)
where Ax >  1 and Aj > 0 are constant preference parameters. Given Ax > 
1, A is ensured to be greater than one. W ith this equation for endogenous 
loss aversion, the utility function becomes:
(W \ar9\)a if A W  >  0 
V{A  W) =  (36)
- \ { W \ a r l \Y  if AW  < 0 
where r9 denotes the potential unit gain. This representation is con­
sistent with the three experimental results discussed previously, reference 
dependence, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity.
This resultant decision rule implies some important aspects of behavior.18 
The first is that even when an individual perceives a gain from speculation, 
they will take a position of limited size due to endogenous prospect theory. 
Another is that individuals may perceive a profit opportunity, but opt to 
hold no position if the expected return is insufficient.
18 For further details on the derivation and constraints imposed see Frydman and Gold­
berg (2007) Chapter 9.
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From the momentary equilibrium, and portfolio balance the basic equi­
librium condition is again
r t |t+ i — P r t\t+ i (37)
Here however rt\t+i is a weighted average of the forecast of bulls holding 
a long position, and bears holding short positions. FG follow Delong et. al. 
(1990) in assuming that there is no reason to expect the wealth of bulls to 
exceed the wealth of bears or vice versa so
The uncertainty premium again is an equal weighted average of bulls and 
bears
The remaining question then is how market participants forecast the po­
tential unit loss from speculation. FG model this uncertainty premium as a 
function of the deviation of the asset’s price from its (more stable) bench­
mark level. This notion that risk depends on the deviation of an asset’s 
price from estimates of its historical or fundamental benchmark level draws 
on a lost insight of Keynes (1936), which FG refer to as the gap effect. As 
the price (or forecasts of the future price) move further away from estimates
), and pft \t+\ =  upt\t+l -I- X2IF P t
1
uP t\t+ i  — 2 (u P t\t+ i u P t\t+ i)  — 2 (1  ^ i ) ( 4 | t + i  4 |t + i )  (^ 9 )
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of its benchmark value, bulls will become more worried about the potential 
for and possible magnitude of a reversal, and will increase their forecast of 
the potential for loss. Consequently, they will demand a greater uncertainty 
premium to increase or maintain their long positions. Meanwhile bears will 
become less concerned about a further movement away, lowering their fore­
cast potential loss and requiring a lower premium. Both the effects for bulls 
and bears will act to increase the aggregate uncertainty premium. As in the 
CAPM, the premium depends on the net long position the market must hold 
(IFP t), but rather than being related to the variance of the exchange rate, it 
is related to this gap effect. DeGrauwe and Grimaldi (2006) similarly model 
the degree of risk aversion in certain versions of their models as depending 
on the difference between the exchange rate and its fundamental value. In 
their model chartists extrapolate past price movements, and fundamentalists 
expect a return to some fundamental level. In the case of the latter, as the 
exchange rate moves further from the fundamental value, they become less 
risk averse. Beyond explaining the time path, this gives the model the oppor­
tunity for more frequent sign reversals, aside from a switch in the IFP term or 
nations alternating from net debtor to net creditor, which could potentially 
remedy the sign reversal puzzle discussed in section 3.2.
In the case of foreign exchange, a natural candidate for such a benchmark 
value is the purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rate, which is the level 
of the exchange rate which equalizes costs across countries. There is a large 
literature on mean reversion of the exchange rate back to this level (Rogoff
52
1996, Taylor and Taylor 1996). To be quite concrete about what is meant 
by the gap effect, the below three graphics show the spot exchange rate in 
black, and an estimate of P P P  in blue (based on the Economist’s P P P  Big 
Mac Index and extrapolated with consumer price indices). The gap then is 
the difference between the two series. The graphics are quite consistent with 
the stylized facts of floating exchange rates, where the exchange rate tends to 
fluctuate in long swings of irregular size and duration around the much more 
gradually moving benchmark of PPP. Ultimately though there is a tendency 
to mean revert back to that level, at least in some non-linear fashion, yet 
there is no tendency to stabilize around it, since conditional on its return it 
often continues trending in the same direction.
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The equilibrium condition implies a  cointegrating relationship between 
the premium and the real exchange (gap). FG refer to this equilibrium 
condition as Uncertainty-adjusted UIP (UAUIP)
This relationship is consistent with other findings that the premium pre­
dicts a negative skewness to returns, or currency crashes (large adverse move­
ments in the exchange rate.) Stated differently, the currency which garners
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a premium possesses more "downside risk" i.e. is more likely to undergo 
a steep and sudden decline in value. Although crashes are not frequent or 
large enough to equalize returns, this can be rationalized if the negative "peso 
states" are weighted more heavily ( Brunnermeier, Negal and Pedersen 2008). 
This greater weighting of the peso states (losses) is consistent with loss averse 
behavior. The model of Frydman and Goldberg then provides additional in­
sight to this observation by suggesting how individuals forecast the potential 
for currency crashes, which leads them to demand a premium in the first 
place. Specifically it is hypothesized that investors do so by looking to the 
gap between the exchange rate and its historical or fundamental benchmark 
level.
1.6.1 Conflicting Predictions of the House M oney and Gap Effects
Despite the fact both the house money and gap models rely on prospective 
utility preferences, they actually generate contradictory predictions. The 
house money effect would predict that the premium should co-vary nega­
tively with upswings of the exchange rate (Frydman and Goldberg 2007 note 
this implication of the house money model), as the exchange increases loss 
aversion decreases and thus so does the equilibrium premium. The IKE gap 
model meanwhile predicts that the premium should co-vary positively with 
upswings of the exchange rate, as the exchange rate increases the forecast of 
potential loss increases, and thus the equilibrium premium. As is clear, the 
two models imply opposing qualitative predictions about the co-movement
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between the premium and the asset price. The two models can be directly- 
related if one assumes the same benchmark in both models.
Frydman and Goldberg (2007) use survey data to measure the premium, 
and test the prediction of these two models.
\
=  P(st -  s T )  (40)
If one assumes the benchmark in both cases is the PP P  exchange rate, 
testing can be done with the real exchange rate as in Frydman and Gold­
berg (2007).19 A coefficient of /5 < 0 would support the house-money effect 
dominating (as the exchange rate increases, bulls reap a gain, and the house- 
money effect leads to a decrease in loss aversion and the premium). If f3 >  0 
this would imply the gap effect dominates (as the exchange rate increases, 
the forecast of potential loss increases, and the premium increases). Fry­
dman and Goldberg find statistically significant estimates of j3 >  0 for all 
three exchange rate samples they investigate.
1.7 W ays to  Im prove T estin g
While the house money and gap effects are mutually exclusive, in that only 
one at most can be observed, it is possible that the effects of risk aversion 
(volatility or the covariance with consumption) may operate simultaneously
19Frydman and Goldberg (2007) use the Economist’s Big Mac PPP index, which tracks 
the cost of a McDonald’s big mac across countries to provide an estimate of price levels.
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with the dominant of these two effects. Previous studies however have not 
tested the ability of the canonical models to explain the premium as measured 
by survey data, nor do they allow for the effects of volatility or consumption 
to act in conjunction with the gap effect. This dual incorporation is motivated 
in part by BHS’s mixed model combining EUT and loss aversion.
In addition to this desirable expansion, the early work on the gap effect 
could be expanded and improved upon in a few ways on statistical grounds. 
Frydman and Goldberg estimate the model using a standard error-correction 
model to account for non-stationarity in the data (see Granger 1983 and 
Engel and Granger 1988). They do not however explicitly test for the non- 
stationarity of the variables, nor do they explicitly test for cointegration 
between the variables. More recent developments in the cointegration lit­
erature have advocated conducting estimation as a system of simultaneous 
cointegrating relationships, known as the Johansen method (Johansen 1988, 
1995) or the Cointegrated VAR model (Juselius 2006). This allows the data 
to "speak freely" about the rank of the information set (number of relation­
ships), and the stochastic trends and error-correcting forces in the system 
(which variables are weakly exogenous and endogenous respectively).20
One major advantage of Frydman and Goldberg’s empirical work (Gold­
berg and Frydman 1996, FVydman and Goldberg 2007) is that they test for 
parameter instability in the relationship, without pre-specifying the place­
20The phrase "speak freely" is borrowed from Hoover, Johasen and Juselius (2007) which 
outlines the CVAR methodology.
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ment or number of breaks, which is surprisingly uncommon in the literature. 
Typically empirical work just assumes parameter constancy. It would be use­
ful however to extend the tests for structural change to newer alternatives 
designed specifically for non-stationary data (for example the eigenvalue fluc­
tuation test of Hansen and Johansen 1999).
More recent work also suggests tha t the exchange rate and real exchange 
rate are more persistent than is commonly recognized. This work highlights 
the importance of conducting testing for persistent changes in the variables 
(near 1(2) trends) using multivariate tests. This 1(2) behavior is a  generaliza­
tion of the earlier broken trends model of Engel and Hamilton (1990) where 
the time-varying drift is stochastic rather than following a markov process 
between two states with opposite sign. A failure to fully address these large 
roots is likely to lead to spurious inference.
While the focus here is on explaining the ex ante premium, it would be 
illuminating to decompose the premium into its components (the interest 
rates, spot exchange rate, and expected future spot exchange rate). This 
would circumvent the potential endogeneity bias arising from having the 
same variable on both sides of the regression, which potentially invalidates 
the inference of a positive relationship between the premium and gap. The 
use of a composite premium variable also represents an untested assumption 
which ideally should be explicitly tested. Further, decomposing the premium 
would provide a clearer picture of the driving and adjustment process. Using 
a composite variable of the premium, as done in Frydman and Goldberg
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(2007), is liable to muddle the dynamics as it is likely some variables within 
it are exogenous while others are adjusting.
The 1(2) model itself also allows for a much richer understanding of the 
driving and adjustment process. It identifies which variables produce the 1(2) 
trends, their shocks leading to the persistent changes of the exchange rate. It 
also allows for a multi-tier adjustment to long-run relationships (the changes 
adjusting to the relationship in levels as in the standard error-correction 
model) and a medium-run adjustment (with the acceleration rates adjusting 
to the changes in other variables). This allows the empirical model to capture 
more naturally the "boom-bust" type processes or long swings often observed 
in asset markets, manifesting as error-increasing behavior where the price 
moves away from equilibrium in the medium-run, which the traditional error- 
correction model is inherently less able to capture.
In summary of the insights for future research: 1) One source of the 
difficulty experienced by the CAPM may be that it simply has the wrong 
measure of volatility. Using a realized measure may rectify this, as they have 
encountered superior performance relative to GARCH formulations in other 
contexts. 2) There is reason to believe however that one should begin by test­
ing premium models against the ex ante survey measures, rather than the 
ex post measures which have been widely determined to yield a misleading 
proxy for the former. 3) Tests conducted with survey data should explicitly 
test for non-stationarity to determine whether the risk premium is truly a 
constant, and whether the estimates are consistent 4) The instability of the
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BF regression suggests that explanations for the forward discount based on 
misforecasting and misforecasting about fundamentals should likewise test 
for parameter constancy. This has major implications for the deduction that 
the bias is due to obvious irrationality. 5) The experimental evidence sug­
gests that EUT is a dubious assumption upon which to base a  risk premium 
model. ■ Models based on PT  are a promising avenue to address the excess 
returns puzzle.The work of Barberis, Huang and Santos (2001) suggests that 
both risk aversion and loss aversion may be important, suggesting a role to 
simultaneously estimate effects of the canonical and newer alternative mod­
els of the premium. 6) Such testing should be conducted as a system using 
more powerful multivariate tests for stationary. 7) Use of the 1(2) model, and 
decomposing the premium into its components, would eliminate endogeneity 
bias and allow for more rigorous testing and a richer understanding of the 
driving and adjustment process in the foreign exchange market; including 
the source of the additional persistence in the real exchange rate (the 1(2) 
trends) and the nature of the boom-bust process often observed (potential 
error-increasing behavior).
1.8 E xp lan ation s b ased  on  n on -R E H  fo reca stin g  and
M arket M icrostru ctu re
The difficulty of the canonical premium models to account for returns, and 
the early results using survey data which suggest that the forward rate bias
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is due primarily to violations of REH have led some researchers to develop 
models which depart from REH. Some of these models assume risk neutrality 
as a matter of convince, and a desire to focus on what is novel in their work 
(Gourinchas and Tornell 2004). It is worth emphasizing however that if one is 
willing to attribute the forward discount not only wholly, but even in part, to 
a lasting, systematic error in forecasting on the part of the aggregate market, 
that one is saying an investor could beat the market and make excess profits 
merely by following a rule as simple as betting against the forward rate. This 
would constitute a truly gross form of market inefficiency.
None the less, it does seem that the development of alternative represen­
tations of forecasting is a worthy line of research, particularly based on the 
results of the survey data, if we are attempting to represent real world behav­
ior. One should be a bit skeptical of the notion that market forecasting errors 
follow a fixed stochastic process, let alone one which is purely white-noise.
The existing behavioral models generally pursue two avenues to depart 
from REH. The first maintains a representative agent, and attributes the 
forward bias to systematic forecasting errors about the process driving fun­
damentals. Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) for example relate the forward dis­
count to systematic underestimates of the persistence of interest rate shocks. 
They find evidence, based on survey data of traders’ forecasts about interest 
rates, that there does seem to be a relation between the forecast error about 
interest rates and the forward discount. Burnside et. al (2011) similarly 
relate the bias to misperceptions of the variance of a fundamental, in this
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case prices. Their model represents agents as underestimating the variance 
of their predictions and thus excessively speculating, which they refer to as 
over-confidence. In both cases, the authors interpret their results to imply 
that there are obvious profit opportunities to be gained, simply by betting 
against the forward rate (though these are said to be rather small). Ba- 
chetta, Mertens and van Wincoop (2007) also find based on survey data that 
the predictability of returns in several markets is related to forecasting errors, 
though in later work Bachetta and van Wincoop (2011) explain this through 
models of rational inattention. Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) similarly note 
that their findings could be the product of robust control behavior, where 
individuals worry about misspecification of their forecasting model, rather 
than naive mis-forecasting.
The second approach allows for heterogeneous expectations, typically of 
two forms, fundamentalists and chartists (or technical traders). The earliest 
model of this type was developed by Frankel and Froot (1989) to explain the 
USD/DM "bubble" in the mid-1980’s (a large appreciation followed by an 
essentially equal depreciation). Delong et al. (1990) develop another model 
of heterogenous expectations in the setting of the stock market. The model 
is populated by rational traders (fundamentalists) and "noise traders" who 
respond to erroneous information. The risk th a t noise traders may push the 
price further away from fundamental values creates a risk for the rational 
traders (given margin requirements and credit constraints) which impedes 
perfect arbitrage back to fundamental values. Mark and Wu (1998) develop
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this model in the foreign exchange market and argue there is preliminary 
empirical support for it based on survey data.
De Grauwe and Grimaldi develop a model with technical traders and fun­
damentalists, where individuals switch between the two strategies according 
to their relative past profitability, and a behavioral rule dictating the speed 
of switching (the length of time over which individuals compare profitabil­
ity). The models are analyzed in an agent-based simulation, and are able to 
replicate many of the stylized facts, including volatility clustering, fat tails, 
long swings, a disconnect from fundamentals, and the profitability (and thus 
ubiquitousness) of technical trading. Thus De Grauwe and Grimaldi are not 
viewing the technical traders as clearly irrational (foregoing obvious profit 
opportunities) but rather view such adaptive forecasting strategies as the 
best one can do in a very complex world.
Another explanation for the excess returns puzzle focuses on the mar­
ket microstructure, and some distortions which may arise due to commonly 
observed trading practices in real world markets. Burnside, Eichenbaum, 
Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2006) examine the returns to currency speculation 
which attempts to exploit the excess returns puzzle. They find that the trade 
is on average quite profitable (a large Sharpe ratio). They focus however on 
the practical implementation of the trade and transaction costs. They ob­
serve that the bid-ask spread is often observed to be an increasing function 
of order size. Another important facet of this literature is "price pressure", 
whereby the exchange rate is an increasing function of net order flow. This
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phenomena can be motivated by either asymmetric information and a re­
sponse against adverse seleetion( Kyle 1985, and Easley and O’Hara 1987), 
or inventory motives (Garman 1976, Stoll 1978, and Cao, Evans and Lyons 
2006). Evans and Lyons (2002) find strong empirical support for the price 
pressure phenomena. Burnside et. al. argue tha t these frictions greatly re­
duce the profitability of attempting to exploit the forward discount anomaly, 
and demonstrate that the marginal profitability (Sharpe ratio) can be zero 
even if the average is large. While this explanation can account for the last­
ing effect of this bias, it does not provide an explanation for why it arises in 
the first place. Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2006b) however develop 
a model where the adverse selection problem is limited when a currency is 
expected to appreciate, which could account for the development of the bias.
The more recent findings however which suggest the presence of a time- 
varying risk premium as measured by survey, and one which appears to be 
correlated with the "gap" risk factor, suggests that these explanations, while 
seemingly part of the story, are at least incomplete, and indeed risk does 
matter. Further the findings of structural change undermine the view that 
individuals are foregoing obvious profit opportunities and the view that any 
given type of systematic misforecasting is occurring endlessly.
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2 CHAPTER II: CURRENCY RISK: VOLATILITY AND LONG  
SWINGS AROUND BENCHM ARK VALUES
Abstract
This study provides an empirical investigation of several risk premium 
models in currency markets, including a traditional capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM) and more recent models that rely on prospect theory. The 
analysis differs from other studies in two important respects. First, it es­
timates the models using ex ante rather than ex post excess returns. This 
enables direct testing of the ex ante implications of the models, rather than 
as a joint hypothesis that also pertains to the nature of forecast errors. Sec­
ond, the empirical analysis applies the cointegrated VAR, which provides a 
powerful systems approach to deal with the problem of unit roots. The main 
result is that we reject the CAPM in favor of the Keynes-IKE gap model, 
which relates risk to the deviation or "gap" between the exchange rate and 
its purchasing power parity value. In addition, and in contrast to much of 
the literature, an effect of the volatility can be detected, but in the short-run 
dynamics and only after controlling for the "gap" effect. This suggests that 
the difficulty in the literature to find the hypothesized effect of volatility on 
the premium was, in part, an omitted variable bias.
65
2.1 In trod u ction
A core puzzle in financial economics is the inability of standard risk-premium 
models to account for excess returns in currency and other asset markets.21 
These models’ microfoundations rely on expected utility theory (EUT) and 
the rational expectations hypothesis (REH). EUT is based on an axiomatic 
approach that represents how an individual chooses among risky portfolios 
given her forecasts of their returns. In traditional portfolio-balance models, 
EUT implies that the one-period-ahead expected excess return - the risk pre­
mium - depends on the ex ante variance of returns. The rational expectations 
hypothesis (REH) is used to portray individuals’ forecasts of the return and 
variance. REH assumes that these forecasts differ from ex post outcomes 
by white noise errors. This assumption is based on a premise that under­
pins much of modern macroeconomics: the process underpinning outcomes at 
every point in time can be represented adequately by a  single, time-invariant, 
conditional probability distribution.
The difficulty these models have encountered is perhaps unsurprising in 
light of the fact that both pillars of standard models lack empirical support. 
Many studies report experimental evidence that EUT’s a priori assumptions 
about risk preferences are grossly inconsistent with the way individuals ac­
tually behave. There is also much evidence from studies using survey data
21 For a review article on the failure of standard theory in currency markets, see Lewis
(1995) and Engel (1996). For other markets, see Campbell et al. (1997) and Seigel and 
Thaler (1997).
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on traders’ actual forecasts against REH’s assumption of white-noise fore­
cast errors.22 Frydman and Goldberg (2007, 2008, 2013a) show that new 
ways of forecasting market outcomes, as well as new economic policies and 
other changes in the social context that cannot be fully foreseen, imply that 
any time-invariant statistical account of returns or forecast errors must even­
tually experience temporal instability at times and in ways that cannot be 
fully anticipated. Evidence of such temporal instability is overwhelming. 
Commenting in an interview with Institutional Investor on the temporal in­
stability of correlations in asset-price data, Nobel laureate William Sharpe 
quipped that “[i]t’s almost true that if you don’t  like an empirical result, 
if you can wait until somebody uses-a different [time] period... you’ll get a 
different answer" (Wallace, 1980, p. 24).
While survey data studies suggest a need to depart from REH, and on 
the whole find evidence of a time-varying risk premium, they leave entirely 
open the question of whether we also need an alternative model of the risk 
premium. In this paper, we provide an empirical investigation of a traditional 
portfolio-balanee risk premium model as well as one that jettisons both pillars 
of standard theory. The latter, which is developed in Frydman and Goldberg 
(2007, 2013a), uses endogenous prospect theory to portray an individual’s 
risk preferences and imperfect knowledge economics (IKE) to represent her 
forecasting behavior.,
Endogenous prospect theory implies that an individual’s risk premium
22See chapter 1 section 4.
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depends not on her expectation of the variance of returns, but on her point 
forecast of the potential loss that she might incur on her speculative position. 
In order to represent this forecast, the model builds on Keynes’ (1936) insight 
that participants rely on a convention in assessing the riskiness of speculation: 
they relate the potential for capital loss to the gap between the asset price and 
their perceptions of its benchmark value.23 Bulls, who hold long positions, 
tend to raise their forecasts of the potential loss as this gap grows, e.g. as 
the asset’s price becomes more overvalued or less undervalued relative to 
the benchmark; whereas bears, who hold short positions, tend to respond 
in opposite fashion. The IKE representations of these forecasts leave open 
the size of the gap effect at any point in time. As such, the model does not 
imply a single, time-invariant, conditional probability distribution of returns. 
Nonetheless, the model implies a momentary equilibrium in which the market 
risk premium tends to co-move positively with the deviation between an 
asset’s price and commonly-used measures of the benchmark value.24
We test this implication by applying a cointegrated VAR analysis to three 
major US dollar currency markets, the pound sterling, the Deutsche mark
23 Tobin (1958) also used this insight in modeling a precautionary motive for money 
demand. In this paper, he also develops the basic portfolio-balance approach, which 
relates financial risk to volatility. The profession picked up on the latter approach and 
completely ignored the former.
24 Frydman and Goldberg (2007) show that the model also has implications for the 
frequency of sign reversals in the market risk premium, which, according to the model, 
should be lower during time periods in which the gap is relatively large. They find empirical 
support for this prediction. By contrast, standard portfolio-balance and consumption 
CAPM models have been unable to account for the sign reversals in the data. See Lewis
(1996) and Mark and Wu (1998).
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(DM), and yen. The CVAR enables us to nest the Keynes-IKE equilibrium 
relationship together with the equilibrium relationship that is implied by a 
standard portfolio-balance model (Kouri, 1976, and Dornbusch, 1983). Our 
empirical analysis makes use of monthly survey data on exchange rate ex­
pectations from Money Market Services International (MMSI).20
These data enable us to measure ex ante returns directly, rather than 
relying on fitted values from regressions based on ex post returns, as is the 
case with other studies. Unfortunately, MMSI’s monthly surveys did not 
collect participants’ forecasts of the variance of returns. Consequently, to 
test the standard risk-premium model, we construct an REH measure of 
this ex ante variance using ex post data on daily realized currency returns 
one-month forward, as well as a backward-looking measure using returns 
one-month prior.
To highlight our results, we find mean shifts in the cointegrating space 
for two of the three currency markets. These shifts occur at times and in 
ways that would be extremely difficult to anticipate fully. For example, the 
mean shift that is found for the DM market occurs in March 1991, which is 
proximate to German reunification. It is difficult to imagine how anyone in 
the early 1980’s could have anticipated this development, let alone foreseen
2,3 MMSI and other survey data on exchange rate expectations have been used extensively 
in the literature, largely to test REH’s implication of white noise forecast errors. For 
references, see footnote 2. Frydman and Goldberg (2007) is the only other study that 
we know of in the exchange rate literature that uses the survey data to test directly the 
implications of risk premium models. See Fuhrer (2013), who uses survey data to test the 
implications of New Keynesian models of output, interest rates, and inflation.
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its exact timing and impact on the process underpinning returns in currency 
markets. Consequently, our results concerning structural change suggest a 
rejection of REH’s presumption of a single probability distribution for cur­
rency returns. However, even if we were to entertain the possibility that one 
could have anticipated the timing and impact of the mean shifts, we reject 
the other key implication of the standard model: we find little to no evi­
dence in the three currency markets of an equilibrium relationship between 
the market risk premium and our REH measure of the ex ante variance of 
returns.
By contrast, we find strong support for the main prediction of the Keynes- 
IKE model. Our cointegration results show a positive equilibrium relation­
ship between the market risk premium and the gap between the exchange rate 
and its purchasing power parity (PPP) value in all three currency markets. 
Surprisingly, we do find that forward- and backward-looking measures of the 
ex ante variance of returns do play a role, but primarily in the short-run 
component of the model and typically occurring through the gap equation. 
This suggests that the inability of the previous literature to detect an effect 
of volatility on the premium was, in part, an omitted variable bias of failing 
to control for this gap effect. This result points to a need to extend the 
Keynes-IKE model, perhaps by using both EUT and endogenous prospect 
theory to represent risk preferences.26
26Barberis et al. (2001) provides an example of such a mixing of approaches in the 
context of an REH model of returns in stock markets. However, the study does not attempt 
to account for the actual time path of the ex ante excess return, as we do here, instead
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2.2 V isu a l In sp ectio n  and  D a ta  Set
It is informative at this point to view some simple graphics of the ex-ante 
survey measure of the risk premium, and the risk factors. This provides a 
visual assessment of two key properties of interest. The first is whether the 
premium appears to undergo persistent fluctuations, or whether it appears 
to be purely white noise around some constant (of particular interest is a 
constant equal to zero which is shown by the black horizontal line across 
the graphics). The second is whether the premium appears to co-vary with 
either of th‘e risk factors.
There are several unique aspects to the information set. The first is 
the use of ex ante survey data, which was collected by Money Market Ser­
vices International (MMSI) for the German mark-US dollar exchange rate 
(DM/USD) for t=1982:12-1998:12, the British pound-US dollar exchange 
rate (BP/USD), and the Japanese yen-US dollar exchange rate (JY/USD), 
the latter two for t =  1982:12-2000:09. MMSI’s forecast data has been used 
in several previous studies including Froot and Frankel (1989). The data is 
the one-month ahead median point forecast of those traders surveyed from 
major institutions. This source has the advantage of being collected from 
all participants on the same day (whereas other surveys may have responses 
over several days or on a rolling basis), and provides a rather lengthy sample
focusing on the so-called equity-premium puzzle. In specifying preferences, Barberis et al. 
(2001) incorporates only one of the key assumptions of prospect theory — loss aversion 
— so that prospect utility can be specified in terms of expected values. Endogenous 
prospect theory allows us to maintain all of Kahneman and Tversky’s findings, including 
diminishing sensitivity, in modeling the speculative decision in asset markets.
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of almost eighteen years, collected monthly for the four most heavily traded 
currencies over the sample. It does of course have the drawback of less recent 
observations; however for the purposes of testing the qualitative predictions 
of the various risk premium models, the benefits of this source are quite 
ideal.27
The other variables which compose the premium, s®+1|t—st +i^ — i t , include 
the spot exchange rate, taken as end-of-period rather than a monthly average 
and designed to correspond to the survey date as closely as possible, and 
the respective countries’ interest rates, measured both as the three-month 
treasury bill rate and the ten-year government bond rate. The latter is also 
tested since Juselius (1995, 2006) and Juselius and MacDonald (2004, 2007) 
find stronger connections of long term rates to the real exchange rate.
The volatility measure, vt\t+\, is a realized measure, meaning it is. con­
structed by taking the variance of intra-period observations. This differs from 
earlier studies which either assume a constant variance, or a GARCH process 
where the variance is a function of the magnitude of the prior period(s) er­
ror term This unconditional calculation has been shown to be an unbiased 
and highly efficient estimator of volatility.28 Here daily observations of ex­
change rate changes are used to calculate the monthly variance measure. The 
volatility measure then is the variance of the change in the log spot exchange
27 Other studies not yet mentioned which use survey data for various purposes include 
Dominguez (1986) and MacDonald and Torrance (1988).
28See French, Schwert and Stambaugh 1987 for monthly measures, and Andersen, Boller- 
slev, Diebold and Labys 2003, and Berndorff-Nielsen and Shephard 2002 for daily mea­
sures.
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rate over both the previous and succeeding month, both designed to proxy 
for the ex ante variance There is thus a forward-looking measure (an REH 
realized measure) and a  backward-looking measure allowing for a deviation 
from REH where the expected variance is not assumed to have been inferred 
with perfect foresight, but rather is extrapolated from the recent past.
The gap measure (or real exchange rate), gapt =  st —p t—P t> is constructed 
using the spot exchange rate, the consumer price indices, and the Economist’s 
"Big Mac PPP index" which is designed to capture the level of the PPP  
exchange rate (whereas the price indices only capture its change).
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A few tentative conclusions can be reached from these graphics, to be 
more formally tested in what follows. There does appear to be a degree 
of persistence to expected returns, with some extended periods over which 
it is primarily negative or positive. Secondly, it appears that the premium
co-varies positively with the gap measure (real exchange rate), which would 
tend to support the gap effect. This tends to contradict Barberis, Huang and 
Santos’s (2001) prediction of a house-money effect which implies that when an 
asset’s price goes up the premium goes down, the intuition being that when 
individuals win money, they become less loss averse. It also appears that the 
premium is more volatile than the gap measure, suggesting that there are 
other risk factors of relevance in addition to the gap, possibly including the 
volatility.
2.3 A pproach  to  T esting  and  Id en tifica tion
The cointegrated VAR (CVAR) model enables us to nest the international 
CAPM and Keynes-IKE gap model in one empirical specification, providing 
the first direct comparison and joint estimation of the two.29 Testing between 
the models is conducted with differing over-identifying restrictions on the 
CVAR discussed in the following section. We can also estimate a hybrid 
model allowing for the effects of both volatility and the gap simultaneously. 
In error-correction form we have:
Aft|t+i =  a  -  ci>t_i|t -  tr'gapi-i ~  Ah] + c A v tlt+1 +  a3Agapt +  et (41)
29See chapter 1 for further discussion of these two models and earlier empirical work on 
them individually.
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where r t|t+1 is the expected excess return, i>t\t+i is the expected variance, 
gapt is the gap, fit captures the deterministic components of both models, as 
well as the international financial positions.
Monthly data on the bi-lateral international financial position between 
countries is not available. However, the very slow trending nature of move­
ments in the international financial position of the U.S. and other advanced 
countries vis-a-vis the rest of the world suggests that bi-lateral positions are 
also slowly trending. To account for the influence of this variable, therefore, 
we allow for piece-wise deterministic trends in the model.
The CVAR model (Johansen 1989, 1991) extends the error-correction 
model of Engel and Granger (1987) to allow for a systems approach with 
mulitple, simultaneous cointegrating relations. The data is ordered in terms 
of the levels of persistence.30 The ECM for a VAR(2) model, i.e. including 
two lags, can be represented generically as:
=  rA x t_i +  nx*_i +  +  Et (42)
where the vector x't =  [s®+1 ^  , gapt , A p t , Apl \ut\t+i] denotes respec­
tively the expected change in the spot exchange rate (as measured by survey 
data), the domestic and foreign interest rates, the gap or real exchange rate, 
and the domestic and foreign inflation rates. The model is also conditioned 
on the volatility measure when testing the traditional model, and the. hybrid
30See Johansen (1996) and Juselius (2006) for book-length treatments of the CVAR 
model.
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model allowing for an effect of gapt and V t \ t + i -  The II matrix is just a refor­
mulation of the covariances in the data, while T represents the coefficients of 
the short-run dynamics. fit represents the deterministic components of the 
model (constant, mean shifts, or break trends etc.), and et is an i.i.d. error 
term.
If the variables in the information set are integrated of order 1 (1(1)), 
the unit roots or common stochastic trends imply that the m atrix II is not 
full rank. When the matrix is reduced rank, it can be decomposed into an 
a  vector and a /3' vector. The f3' vector describes the linear combinations 
of the variables which become stationary. The 0  vectors are interpreted as 
representing an equilibrium between the variables. The a  vector meanwhile 
describes the error-correction mechanism indicating which variables are en­
dogenous and adjust back to equilibrium following shocks.
The cointegrated VAR is designed to allow the data to "speak freely" in 
terms of the rank (number of relationships in the information set), and the 
pulling and pushing forces of the system (which variables axe error-correcting 
and which are weakly exogenous driving the equilibrium), rather than con­
straining the data from the outset with untested assumptions concerning the 
rank and causation.31
Identification in the CVAR is achieved by imposing restrictions on the 
coefficients of the cointegrating relationships. This is accomplished by focus-
31This term "speak freely" comes from Hoover, Johansen, and Juselius (2006). See also 
Hendry and Mizon (1993) for more on the general-to-specific methodology of the CVAR.
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mg on the expected return, imposing two symmetry restrictions that imply 
that the coefficients on the expected change in the exchange rate and the two 
interest rates are equal, though with opposite signs for the domestic interest 
rate, and are normalized to one. These restrictions lead to the expected ex­
cess return on foreign exchange s^t+1 — s t +  — it as a  variable in the model,
and by restricting the inflation rates to zero in the premium relationships, 
over-identification is achieved and the standard errors and stationarity of the 
relationships can be estimated.
The volatility measures possess a large positive skewness, due to not 
only the preponderance of large positive shocks, but also the dearth of large 
negative shocks. Consequently to achieve a statistically well-specified model, 
meeting the requisite properties for valid statistical inference, the relationship 
is conditioned on this volatility measure rather than incorporating it with 
long-run feedback.
2.4  S tructural C hange and  D eterm in istic s
As discussed in chapter one, a central argument of IKE and Frydman and 
Goldberg’s contingent expectations hypothesis (CEH) is tha t the future is, 
in part, open, and change occurs in ways that are truly indeterminate in 
advance. They cite Popper’s (1957) argument that no society can predict 
the future states of knowledge, no one can know what they will only learn 
tomorrow. This openness and the presence of imperfect knowledge provokes 
heterogenous forecasting strategies which individuals are liable revise over
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time. This revision of forecasting both reflects and produces a changing 
process driving market outcomes.
The CVAR allows for such change, without splitting the sample, through 
the implementation of broken deterministics in the cointegrating space (a 
trend or mean which is allowed to change a t some point(s) in time). The 
choices for the deterministic components are evaluated on several criteria in­
cluding the statistical significance of any breaks, the residual analysis, the 
stationarity of the resulting relations, and the tests of parameter stability. 
The tests of parameter stability rely on the eigenvalue fluctuation test of 
Hansen and Johansen (1999). This particular procedure has the benefit of 
providing evaluation by individual cointegrating relations, allowing focus on 
the first relation with the premium which is the primary interest of this 
study. Testing for parameter stability is an important aspect of validating 
the robustness of any inference. The upper left panel in each diagram is rep­
resentative of the first cointegrating relation (the one between the premium 
and gap) while the upper right, lower left, and lower right are the second, 
third, and system respectively. In the fluctuation test the green series rep­
resents the reduced model excluding the short-run dynamics while the blue 
represents the full model with them included, which generally follow each 
other quite closely.
81
The first two panels presented are for the DM sample prior to







The next two panels are for the DM sample with the mean shift
included.
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According to the eigenvalue fluctuation test, the first cointegrating rela­
tion does not exceed the statistical threshold to reject parameter stability 
even prior to the mean shift. A rejection is indicated by the series exceed­
ing the value of one, represented by the horizontal black line (when present
depending on the scale of the image). Inclusion of the mean shift however 
reduces the instability in the third relationship (which could be interpreted 
as the relation for German inflation), and is statistically significant in the 
premium relation. It also improves the stationarity of the premium relation 
and the significance of the gap effect. This demonstrates the importance of 
accounting for structural change, as failing to do so partially obscures the 
relationship between the premium and the gap. The timing of the mean 
shift was selected based on the timing of the fluctuation in the eigenvalue 
estimates (when we start to see an increase in the series) and is proximate 
to German reunification. Juselius and MacDonald (2004) find an identical 
needed mean shift in their work examining a similar information set only 
absent the survey data.
The parameters of the BP sample appear to be quite stable, particularly 
for the first cointegrating relation, once allowing for an outlier corresponding 
to the departure of Britain from the European Monetary System. One could 
alternatively allow for a mean shift at this time, which would not in any 
large way alter the qualitative deduction of a gap effect, though the relation 
would be less stationary, which could be interpreted as "over-fitting" where 
the deterministics substitute for some dynamics which could otherwise be 
represented as the stochastic trends and error-correction.
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The next two panels are for the BP sample without a mean shift
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The yen sample is the most difficult to model statistically, requiring a 
trend and three lags to address serial correlation. The results are also more 
sensitive to the choice of deterministics than those for the DM and BP.
85
The next two figures show the results for the yen sample prior 
to the break in trend.
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While the first relation, representing UAUIP, is fairly stable, the inclu­
sion of the break in trend is significant in the relation, and by addressing this 
structural change it actually makes the connection between the premium and 
the gap more clear, again highlighting the importance of addressing signif­
icant structural change, when present, to illuminate our understanding. It
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also improves the parameter constancy of the second and third cointegrating 
relations.




The presence of such structural change in the relationships, which would 
appear to be quite difficult to predict in advance, suggests a rejection of 
REH’s presumption of an invariant probability distribution, in favor of the
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CEH view predicting non-routine structural change. Of course, as a  problem 
of induction, one can never prove tha t a timeless relationship driving market 
outcomes does not exist, however it appears that studies which actually test 
for structural change in any given relationship consistently find it.
2.5 R esu lts:
2.5.1 The Persistence of Expected Excess Returns
To begin the empirical work, we start by testing whether the restrictions 
implied by UIP constitute a cointegrating relationship, or in other words 
whether expected returns are stationary around zero. A rejection of this 
hypothesis suggests that there is a risk premium. Secondly we test whether 
the premium is stationary around the deterministic components of the model 
(broken constant or broken trend), to determine how much of the stationar- 
ity in the following models is due to the deterministics. A rejection of this 
hypothesis suggests a time-varying risk premium even beyond these breaks. 
The following tests are conducted using the information set for the gap model, 
but restricting that term to zero in each case. The p-values presented are 
a likelihood ratio test of the restrictions and stationarity, and are following 
a bartlett correction (which raises the p-value). The p-value can be inter­
preted similarly to an adjusted R-squared, in th a t it penalizes the inclusion 
of irrelevant variables.
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The below table provides a test of a stationary expected premium around 
zero (as implied by UIP where expected returns equalize), for all three ex­
change rates with both short and long term interest rates.
Exchange Rate short rates long rates
D M / U S D 0.021 0.011
B P / U S D 0.002 0.009
J Y / U S D 0.001 0.141
The results strongly reject UIP for all measures using short term interest 
rates, and for long rates in the DM and BP samples. UIP does appear to be 
stationary ex-ante for the JY sample with long rates, but as will be seen the 
relation will become much more stationary once including the gap term ( by 
more stationary it is meant that the deviations from the relationship will be 
less persistent).
The following table provides the results with the premium restriction, 
and allowing for the deterministics in the RAUIP and UAUIP models (mean 
shift for the DM and BP samples, and a  broken trend for the JY sample).
Exchange Rate short rates long rates
D M / U S D 0.033 0.020
B P / U S D 0.002 0.011
J Y /U S D 0.313 0.054
The expected premium also does not appear to be stationary around a 
constant for the BP sample, around a constant with a mean shift in 1991:03
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for the DM sample, while nearly rejected as well for the JY sample with long 
rates (which is a bit odd given its higher p-value excluding the deterministics, 
suggesting these terms are most important for their impact on the other 
relationships or gap effect). Here it does appear that the expected premium 
is a stationary relationship for the JY sample with the deterministics and 
short term interest rates, though incorporation of the gap variable greatly 
improves its stationarity (to a p-value of .689, see appendix).
2.5.2 Tests of Risk-Adjusted and Uncertainty-Adjusted UIP
The table below reports the results for the relationship between the premium 
and the volatility measure (RAUIP), the gap (UAUIP or the house-money 
effect) and a model including both effects following Barberis, Huang and 
Santos’s (2001) suggestion that both the effects of risk aversion and loss 
aversion may be important. The CVAR model allows one to nest all of these 
models in one empirical specification, and to test across them with the use 
of alternative restrictions. In all cases the premium restriction is imposed 
for identification, and the inflation rates are restricted to zero to achieve 
over-identification. In the volatility models, the volatility measure is given 
a free parameter, while the gap is restricted to zero, and vice versa for the 
gap model. Both are given a free parameter in the hybrid model allowing for 
both effects. The coefficient estimates, with the t-value in parentheses below, 
and the p-value for the test of the restrictions and a stationary cointegrating 
relationship are presented for each of the three exchange rate samples. The
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results below are for those using long rates, which are in some models stronger 
(see appendix for those with short rates). The bond rates are represented by 
the symbol b.
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Right hand side variable, the premium: stt-i|t — st +  — bt
/? vector Ylead gapt const. mean s h i f t p — value
D M / U S D 0.981 0 0.001 -0 .006 0.009
(2.682) — (0.695) (-2 .211)
D M / U S D 0 2.660 0.001 -0 .012 0.514
— (4.563) (0.480) (-4 .866)
D M / U S D 1.368 2.667 0.001 -0.011 0.338
(2.692) (3.560) (0.499) (-4 .470)
B P / U S D 0.349 0 0.002 — 0.012
(1.719) — (0.810) —
B P / U S D 0 -1 .936 -0 .002 — 0.617
— (-2 .330) (-2 .238) —
B P / U S D 3.193 2.708 0.004 — 0.386
(2.052) (3.607) (1.813) —
J Y /U S D 0.162 0 0.000 -0.000 0.224
(2.379) — (0.520) (-0 .362)
J Y / U S D 0 1.888 0.001 -0.000 0.478
— (3.405) (.475) (-2 .621)
J Y / U S D 0.052 2.013 0.001 -0 .013 0.289
(2.373) (2.739) (.819) (-6 .977)
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A few general results emerge, which are robust to the alternative mod­
eling specifications32. The first is that in all cases the UAUIP relationship 
(including the gap effect) is stationary, and more stationary than  the RAUIP 
relationship (including volatility). In all cases, the gap variable is positive 
and significant, corroborating the hypothesis of the IKE gap model, and con­
tradicting an implication of the house-money effect that when an asset’s price 
increases the risk premium decreases. Interestingly, the coefficient on the gap 
variable as measured is very similar to the degree of loss aversion estimated 
by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), in a range around 2.25 (1.89-2.97 across 
the three samples). This is also true for the alternative modeling specifica­
tions featured in the appendix. This is of some interest in th a t one class of 
the standard models (the' CCAPM) have had some difficulty in accounting 
for returns with a reasonable degree of risk aversion.33
When using the month-ahead realized volatility measure, the variable is of 
the correct sign, and significant, whereas there has been no' such connection 
in the majority of the literature. While it is not quite significant in the case of 
the BP sample at 5%, it does become so once simultaneously incorporating 
the gap variable. The RAUIP relationships however are strongly rejected 
as stationary in the case of the DM and BP samples, suggesting that this 
does not constitute a sufficient equilibrium relationship to describe the data.
32 Exhaustive combinations using short and long term interest rates, lagged or leading 
volatility, and separate or nested testing can be' found in the appendix.
33 This literature was discussed in chapter one and will be discussed further in chapter 
three.
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The relationship does become stationary however after adding the gap term, 
but incorporation of the volatility series actually lowers the p-value of the 
relationship compared to that solely including the gap. The p-value can 
be interpreted similarly to an adjusted R-squared, implying that volatility’s 
value in providing additional information about the long-run cointegrating 
relationship with the premium does not outweigh the cost of adding more 
parameters to the model.
2.5.3 E rro r-C o rrec tio n
The below graphic provides the results for the a  vector, or pulling forces 
which adjust back to any disequilibrium. Error-correction is implied by a 
significant coefficient for the change in a variable (based on the t-values in 
parentheses below), and with the opposite sign to that in the j3 vector. The 
results exclude those for the interest rates for the sake of space, as they 
were almost all insignificant, and in the one exception was of very small 
magnitude (-.007 for the BP volatility model). The tests of weak exogeneity 
support those in the alpha vectors that the interest rates are not adjusting to 
disequilibrium (see appendix). The volatility measure is also automatically 
excluded since the models are conditioning on it, rather than incorporating 
it with long-run feedback due to the skewness of the measure.
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a  vector A (*t+i|t “  st) AApt AA p* A gapt
D M / U S D -0.605 0.291 -0.766 0.007
(-0.819) (2.572) (-8.376) (0.334)
D M / U S D -0.696 -0.118 0.051 0.005
(-5.894) (-6.392) (3.441) (1.670)
D M / U S D -0.621 0.209 -0.543 0.008
(-1.189) (-2.560) (-8.248) (0.538)
B P / U S D -0.408 -0.013 -0.032 -0.004
(-5.499) (-0.542) (-2.016) (-1.471)
B P / U S D -0.501 -0.011 0.001 -0.003
(-6.760) (-0.468) (0.056) (-0.845)
B P / U S D -0.529 -0.022 -0.045 -0.003
(-6.296) (-0.818) (-2.463) (-0.908)
■JY/USD -0.750 -0.039 0.262 0.004
(-3.398) (-0.778) (10.057) (0.803)
J Y / U S D -0.416 -0.275 0.072 0.004
(-3.477) (-6.521) (3.483) (0.967)
J Y / U S D * -0.367 0.864 -0.440 -0.003
(-0.661) (-9.001) (-2.248) (-0.121)
The results on the error-correction are fairly consistent across the samples. 
The largest magnitude adjustment is often through the expected change in 
the exchange rate sf+1|t — st . The estimate varies between -0.35 and -0.75,
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implying an equilibrium correction within one (monthly) period of between 
roughly one-third and three-fourths, barring further shocks. This suggest a 
half-life of deviations from the UAUIP equilibrium of approximately one to 
two months or less. It is of note th a t estimates of the half-life of deviations 
from PPP have been in the range of three to five years. This suggests that 
UAUIP, an equilibrium relation between the expected premium and gap, 
provides a substantially improved characterization of equilibrium than does 
PPP.
In some of the models which include volatility, the error-correction of the 
expected change in the exchange rate is not significant however, which given 
the large magnitude may suggest an imprecise estimate due to a fluctuat­
ing degree of adjustment over the sample. In these instances, the significant 
adjustment appears to occur through the inflation rates. Recall that the 
gap is st — pt — p* in natural logs, and thus a positive coefficient on the 
domestic inflation rate, and a negative coefficient on the foreign inflation 
rate are consistent with error-correction. In the other cases, where the ex­
pected change in the exchange rate is significantly adjusting, there are at 
times instances of error-increasing behavior, where the inflation rate moves 
away from the equilibrium, though the coefficient is smaller than that of the 
expected change, implying overall error-correction in the relationship, as is 
necessary to produce a cointegrating relation.
The results of the alpha vector as well as the tests for weak exogeneity 
(see appendix) suggest that the system is largely driven by shocks to the
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interest rates and to a lesser degree the real exchange rate, with adjustment 
coming through the expected change in the exchange rate and to a lesser 
degree the inflation rates. The Keynes-IKE gap theory implies both very 
rapid adjustment, as well as exogenous interest rates (determined in the 
money market).
2.5.4 Short-Run Dynamics of Volatility
While volatility appeared to have little relevance in understanding the move­
ments of the long-run equilibrium premium, as defined by the cointegrating 
relations, it does appear to have some significant impacts on the short-run 
dynamics. The results below are the results from the joint model includ­
ing the gap and volatility. The number of lags included depend on the VAR 
structure of the model. Conditioning on the volatility measure in the VAR(3) 
model for example, as was used in the JY sample, includes a contemporane­
ous effect at time t, and two lagged effects at time t-1 and t-2, whereas the 
t-2 effect is excluded from a VAR(2) model as is the case for the DM and 
BP samples. The results for the bond rates are excluded, as the results were 
almost wholly insignificant, with one exception of a contemporaneous effect 
on the Japanese bond rate, though the magnitude is rather low (—0.009).
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A (set+i\t -  st) A A pt AA  p\ Agapt
D M A V 2.093 -0 .456 0.362 0.035
(1.552) (-2 .167) (2.128) (0.946)
DMAV_i 0.236 -0 .016 -0 .389 0.038
(0.180) (-0 .076) (-2 .350) (1.039)
B P A V 0.900 0.108 -0 .099 0.063
(1.161) (0.424) (-0 .589) (1.953)
BPAV .Li 0.551 0.589 -0 .004 0.002
(0.673) (2.199) (-0.194) (0.069)
J Y A V 0.025 0.003 -0 .057 -0 .0 0 8
(0.337) (0.132) (-4.514) (-2 .973)
J Y A Y j 0.016 0.008 -0 .030 -0 .002
(0.201) (0.280) (-2 .194) (-0 .531)
JYAV-2 0.015 0.004 0.004 -0 .002
(0.210) (0.160) (0.330) (-0 .896)
Some significant results of the change in volatility are observed for the 
change in interest rates in the JY sample, but there are no significant effects 
on the interest rates in the other two samples. The magnitude of the effects on 
the expected change in the exchange rate are not significant but are generally 
large compared to those of the other (even significant) variables. This in turn 
may suggest that the impact of volatility on the expected change is rather 
sizable, but simply rather unstable over time and thus imprecisely estimated.
98
This is very similar to the error-correction results on the expected change in 
the exchange rate for many of the models which included volatility, where 
the adjustment was quite large, though in some instances not significant.
The most striking result is that the effect of volatility appears to act al­
most wholly through the variables associated with the gap (the gap itself 
and the inflation rates). If we exclude the gap and inflation rates, we ob­
serve almost no significant impacts of volatility on the other variables (those 
associated with the premium), and none in two of the three samples. Thus 
it seems it is important to incorporate the gap effect, not only to establish 
cointegration and understand movements in the premium, but also again to 
understand the connection of volatility to the premium. It appears that it is 
actually the change in volatility which is causing changes in the real exchange 
rate and the inflation rates, rather than causing a direct change in level of 
the premium through the level of volatility.
2.6 C onclusion
The results provide robust corroboration to the prediction of the Keynes- 
IKE gap model of the premium. The expected premium was found to form a 
stationary cointegrating relationship with the gap between the exchange rate 
and its PPP  value for all three exchange rate samples, across an array of mod­
eling specifications amounting to 30 regressions in total, with a significant 
coefficient of the correct sign. This demonstrates that the excess returns and
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long swings in exchange rates, which have appeared as anomalous to much of 
contemporary theory, can be reconciled through synthesis in the IKE frame­
work. Increases in the real exchange rate are generally produced by expected 
excess returns (driven primarily by interest rate differentials according to the 
analysis), and these excess returns can exist in equilibrium because they are 
offset by the risk associated with the movements away from P P P  which they 
produce.
The positive and significant gap effect is additionally important in that 
it tends to undermine two common explanations for excess returns and long 
swings. The first being that UIP does hold ex ante, and individuals are simply 
irrational. When using data on traders’ actual expectations, UIP was rejected 
for five of the six samples, and was greatly improved when appending the 
gap to represent a fundamental risk factor (and thus even expected returns 
are correlated with time-t information). It does not, however, conflict with 
arguments about the need for non-REH representations of forecasting, based 
on the results of other studies using survey data, but it does suggest that, in 
addition, risk certainly seems to m atter and is related to this gap effect.
The second common conjecture which these results undermine is tha t of 
a counter-cyclical risk premium, for example as implied by the house-money 
effect. The idea is that long upswings are driven by, or cause, decreases in risk 
aversion. The empirical results here actually imply both the opposite sign 
of the relationship, and the opposite causation, where increases in the price 
tend to raise the assessment of potential loss, resulting in a pro-cyclical risk
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premium. This is not to say that, at times, changes to other extraneous risk 
factors cannot produce changes in the price, be it upswings or downswings, in 
fact the presence of significant mean shifts demonstrate this occurrence. The 
more common fluctuations in the premium however appear to  be connected 
to this gap effect, producing a generally pro-cyclical movement (or at least 
there is clearly some risk factor which is positively correlated with the gap). 
It is also quite clear from a simple examination of the graphics between the 
expected premium and the gap from P P P  that they co-vary positively, which 
has been robustly confirmed by more rigorous econometric tests.
Conditioning on the one-month prior or ahead measure of realized volatil­
ity, based on daily returns, we did observe statistically significant effects on 
the premium, though in one of the three samples only once incorporating the 
gap, and the relationship was only stationary once including the gap. The 
results do suggest however that these monthly measures of realized volatil­
ity may be primarily useful in understanding the short-run dynamics of the 
equilibrium between the premium and the gap. Most interestingly, they ap­
pear to operate primarily through the gap, so the change in volatility affects 
changes in the gap. This suggests th a t the difficulty in the literature to 
find the hypothesized connection between the premium and volatility was, 
in part, an omitted variable bias from failing to control for this gap effect of 
how far. the exchange rate has moved away from PPP.
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3 CHAPTER III: DOES THE CONSUM PTION CAPM  HELP
IN ACCOUNTING FOR EXPECTED CU RRENCY RETURNS?
Abstract
This study provides the first test of the CCAPM using ex ante survey 
data, rather than assuming REH and using ex post returns. It is possible 
that the implausibly large degree of risk aversion found in previous studies is 
a by-product of the joint hypothesis of REH and not a deficiency of the spec­
ification of risk preferences. The study also departs from REH by using not 
only forward looking rolling windows of the covariance between the exchange 
rate and consumption, but also backward-looking measures. Interestingly, 
the model is able to produce more reasonable estimates of the degree of risk 
aversion, but only in the case of a sufficiently long backward-looking rolling 
window. There-is evidence that including the real exchange rate improves the 
stationarity and produces even more plausible estimates of the degree of risk 
aversion, though the covariance and real exchange rate appear to have a high 
degree of multicollinearity.
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3.1 A n  Inab ility  to  A cco u n t for R etu rn s w ith  a  P la u ­
sib le  D egree o f R isk  A version
Chapter 2 reported evidence in three major currency markets tha t the risk 
premium, as measured by survey data, co-moves positively with the gap be­
tween the exchange rate and its purchasing power parity (PPP) level. It was 
also found that this qualitative relationship is contingent: it changes at times 
and in ways that would seem to be quite difficult to anticipate, for example 
related to the reunification of Germany. The results show th a t the Keynes- 
IKE model provides a much better account of ex ante returns in currency 
markets than the traditional CAPM. Indeed, there is no evidence, on its own, 
of the CAPM’s main implication of an equilibrium relationship between the 
risk premium and either REH-based or backward-looking measures of the ex 
ante volatility of returns. This evidence suggests that the empirical failure 
of the traditional CAPM stems in part perhaps from its sole reliance on ex­
pected utility theory (EUT) to model decision making and preferences under 
uncertainty.
However, the cointegrating VAR (CVAR) results do suggest a role for 
EUT. They indicate that there is a connection between short-term move­
ments of the risk premium and measures of realized volatiltiy in all three 
currency markets examined. These short-term relationships were found only 
after incorporating the gap effect and mean shifts in the cointegrating space 
to account for the contingent nature of the relationship.These results suggest
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a need to integrate the Keynes-IKE gap model and the traditional CAPM in 
future research.
This chapter incorporates a version of the consumption CAPM (CCAPM) 
class of models into the empirical analysis of ex ante currency returns. As 
we saw in chapter 1, this workhorse implies tha t the market’s expected ex­
cess return—its risk premium—on foreign exchange is positively related to 
the market’s expectation of the covariance between consumption and the ex­
change rate. This chapter first explores whether this model can account for 
ex ante returns, using the CVAR methodology and the survey data that were 
employed in the previous chapter.
As discussed in chapter 1, researchers typically find that the model fails 
empirically when confronted with ex post data on excess returns. The prob­
lem seems to be that estimates of the ex ante covariance tha t are based on 
ex post data are insufficiently variable to account for ex post returns, leading 
to implausibly high estimates of the degree of risk aversion. However, this 
failure, like the failure of the traditional CAPM, could stem from either the 
CCAPM’s reliance on REH to model forecasting behavior or its assumptions 
concerning the ex ante—risk premium—component of excess returns. The 
analysis in this chapter provides the first study to test the implications of 
the CCAPM’s ex ante component directly using ex ante data on returns. A 
finding that these returns are related to measures of the ex ante covariance 
with a reasonable degree of risk aversion would imply that the problem with 
the CCAPM lies with its reliance on REH and the use of ex post returns in
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proxying ex ante returns, and not with EUT.
Incorporating the CCAPM into the empirical analysis also enables exam­
ination of whether the empirical difficulty of the CAPM is due to its reliance 
on EUT or its two-period, portfolio-balance setup. The two-period setup is 
a special case of the more general CCAPM, which characterizes market par­
ticipants’ trading decisions by assuming that they optimize intertemporally 
over an infinite horizon.34 Empirical support for the CCAPM’s main impli­
cations would suggest that the problem with the tradional CAPM is with 
the two-period setup.
The second part of this chapter examines which model—the CCAPM or 
the Keynes-IKE gap model—provides the better account of ex ante returns in 
currency markets. One of the questions explored here is whether the CVAR 
results continue to point to a need to integrate models based on endogenous 
prospect theory with those based on EUT.
To test the CCAPM, measures of the ex ante covariance are needed. In 
similar fashion to the ex ante measures of volatility in the preceding chapter, 
we make use of rolling windows of different lengths of the realized monthly 
covariance. The empirical relevance of REH-based (forward-looking) and 
backward-looking measures are examined, both of which allow for the process 
underlying currency returns to change in ways th a t cannot be fully antici­
pated. Allowing for such structural change contrasts sharply with earlier em-
34 Giovanni and Jorion (1989) show the two are equivalent if the degree of intertemporal 
substitution in the CCAPM is equal to 1.
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pirical studies that impose on their analysis the assumption th a t the process 
underlying currency returns is time-invariant.
To preview the results, there is some evidence that the CCAPM is able 
to account for ex ante returns with a more plausible degree of risk aversion, 
but only when using sufficiently long, backward-looking measures of the ex 
ante covariance. A clear pattern emerges for all three currency markets: the 
longer the length of the backward-looking measure, the smaller the estimate 
of risk aversion. However, measures of the ex ante covariance that are based 
on a  rolling window of three years (the longest window) create additional 
persistence in the series and thus a problem of large unaddressed roots in the 
empirical model. This casts serious doubt on the test statistics in this case. 
There is thus a trade-off between longer rolling windows yielding smaller 
coefficient estimates, but worse "fit" or stationarity of the relationship. The 
two year backward-looking windows lead to less unexplained persistence in 
the model and provide support for the CCAPM with more plausible (lower) 
degrees of risk aversion, but in some cases they are in the high range of what 
many would consider reasonable.
The significance of the covariance term motivates estimation with both 
the covariance and gap term from the Keynes- IKE model, measured as the 
real exchange rate. Controlling for the real exchange rate in each case yields 
more plausible estimates of the degree of risk aversion and improved station­
arity. In some cases though the multicollinearity between the covariance and 
the gap reduces the significance of the covariance or both terms. The results
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seem to suggest a connection between the covariance and gap, but that the 
effect of the covariance can largely be absorbed by the gap term if the former 
is omitted.
3.2 V isu a l In sp ection  and  D a ta  Set
Following from the previous discussion, it is of interest to  examine the corre­
spondence between the expected change in the exchange rate (measured by 
the survey data from the previous chapter), and the actual future change in 
the exchange rate (the next period ex post change).
BP/USD expected change in the spot exchange rate (red) and the ex post 
future return (blue)
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DM/USD expected change in the spot exchange rate (red) and the ex 
post future return (blue)
.2
55 £
JY /USD expected change in the spot exchange rate (red) and the ex post 
future return (blue)
As seen, the actual future change is much more volatile than the expected 
change. The standard result which highlights the deficiency of the CCAPM,
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that consumption appears not to vary enough to account for ex post returns, 
could be in part explained simply by ex post returns being too volatile of 
a proxy for expected returns. In other words, the primary problem could 
be the assumption of REH as opposed to the assumption concerning risk 
preferences (where risk is related to the pro-cyclicality of payoffs).
This chapter will again use survey data and the CVAR methodology dis­
cussed in chapter two to now test the ex ante implication of the CCAPM, 
that the premium is related to the ex ante covariance of the exchange rate 
and consumption. The covariance is measured using various length rolling 
windows at the one, two, and three year horizons, calculated both forward 
(akin to assuming REH) and backward, allowing for a deviation from REH 
where market participants extrapolate the future covariance based on recent 
experience (this could be viewed as an IKE version of the ex ante covari­
ance). To solidfy understanding of the measure, as an example the one-year 
forward rolling window takes the monthly observations of the log of the spot 
exchange rate and the log of US personal consumption expenditure per capita 
and calculates the sample covariance (j^rj; — c)(s, — s)) between the
two series over that upcoming year, for each observation of the covariance. 
This differs quite dramatically from previous tests of the model, which as­
sume a specific utility function and REH to measure the marginal rate of 
substitution and the expected return, in order to test the Euler equation 
that Et[jil+l =  0. Instead here we measure the expected return via
survey data and test whether its time path can be explained by the realized
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covariance between the exchange rate and consumption.
The BP/USD Premium (in blue) and the Three-year Backward Covari­
ance (in blue)
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The BP/USD Premium (in blue) and the Two-year Forward covariance
(in blue)
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The DM/USD Premium (in blue) and the three-year Adaptive covariance
(in black)
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The JY/USD Premium (in blue) and the one-year rolling covariance (in
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While the connection between the premium and the covariance will be 
tested more rigorously in what follows, it is worth reflecting on some of 
the basic properties of the premium and covariance series, and their co­
movements. As observed and tested in the previous chapter, the premium 
appears to possess some persistence. One clear observation is that the co- 
variance measure naturally becomes more persistent the longer the rolling 
window. Successive estimates of the covariance will share N-2 observations 
in calculating the sample covariance, since the following month covariance 
will drop one observation from the beginning of the sample and add one ob­
servation at the end, as is the definition of a rolling window. Consequently, 
the longer the rolling window the greater proportion of shared observations 
between successive estimates of the covariance. Lastly, there does appear 
to be a fair amount of co-movement between the premium and covariances, 
particularly for the DM and BP samples, though less so at the three-year 
horizons (which are highly persistent) and for forward-looking measures.
3.3 R esu lts
The tests for lag-length determination consistently demonstrate in all models 
that three lags are required to address serial-correlation in the data. All of 
the presented models possess a rank of one, one cointegrating relation in 
the system and three common stochastic trends.30 After imposing the over- 
30 See appendix for further details on specification testing.
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identifying restrictions to produce the expected return s®+1|t — i t , which
we can interpret as the left-hand side variable, we can estimate the magnitude 
and significance of the covariance term (the t-values are presented below the 
coefficient estimates in parentheses), and the stationaxity of the relationship 
(assessing whether the restrictions are consistent with the data  and whether 
the relationships adequately define equilibrium relations). The stationarity 
is represented by the p-value where the null hypothesis is a stationary error 
term. The model is estimated using both backward (adaptive) and forward- 
looking rolling windows of the covariance at the one, two, and three year 
horizons.
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B P /U S D Cov constant p  — value
3 — year adaptive 0.364 0.002 0.560
(0.292) (1.799)
2 — year adaptive 3.638 0.002 0.470
(1.760) (1.760)
1 — year adaptive 25.004 0.002 0.396
(3.750) (1.755)
1 — year forward 11.411 0.002 0.525
(1.647) (1.613)
2 — year forward 1.735 0.002 0.580
(0.796) (2.110)
3 — year forward -2.164 0.002 0.844
(1.813) (-2.264)
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J Y /U S D Cov constant mean s h if t p  — value
3 — year adaptive 4.237 -0.003 0.010 0.519
(3.443) (2.238) (6.115)
2 — year adaptive 6.948 -0.003 0.010 0.578
(2.767) (2.489) (5.742)
1 — year adaptive 29.737 -0.003 0.010 0.589
(3.621) (-2.347) (5.627)
1 — year forward 40.921 0.000 0.010 0.132
(2.997) (0.146) (4.635)
2 — year forward -2.720 -0.005 0.012 0.433
(0.995) (-3.938) (6.544)
3 — year forward -2.528 -0.006 0.014 0.867
(1.686) (-4.253) (6.713)
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D M /U S D Cov constant mean s h if t p  — value
3 — year adaptive 7.502 -0.000 0.006 0.722
(5.515) (-0.101) (2.711)
2 — year adaptive 12.468 -0.000 0.006 0.416
(4.207) (-0.221) (2.448)
1 — year adaptive 39.813 -0.001 0.006 0.539
(4.409) (0.324) (2.452)
1 — year forward 22.222 -0.000 0.006 0.101
(-2.598) (1.973) (1.973)
2 — year forward -23.618 -0.006 0.015 0.338
(-4.943) (2.801) (4.514)
3 — year forward -5.675 -0.006 0.013 0.174
(2.598) (3.038) (4.935)
A few common patterns emerge in the results. The estimates of the coeffi­
cient of relative risk aversion for the one-year rolling window of the covariance 
is implausibly large, consistent with the existing literature on the CCAPM 
which conducts testing with ex post returns. Extending the rolling win­
dow backwards though leads to increasingly plausible coefficient estimates. 
There is a statistical trade-off ultimately though, as the longer rolling win­
dow inherently increases the persistence of the series, leading eventually to 
large roots in the differenced process (near-I(2)ness). For this reason, the 
p-value at the three year horizons should be interpreted more cautiously, 
potentially implying cointegration not to 1(0) but rather to near 1(1) station-
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arity. The backward looking two-year rolling window models all appear to 
be well-specified though in terms of the rank.
Another consistent finding is that the backward looking measures appear 
to better explain the time path of the expected returns as measured by survey, 
when compared to the equivalent horizon forward-looking measures, in terms 
of stationarity, and the sign and significance of the covariance term. In fact 
at the two and three year forward horizon the measures tend to take on the 
wrong sign. There are no instances where the forward looking measure has 
a significant, and plausible coefficient (positive and less than 10), whereas 
there is at least one such observation in the backward-looking measures for 
all three samples.
3.3.1 Error-Correction
The alpha vector coefficients tell how much of the disequilibrium a variable 
corrects within each (monthly) period. If the coefficient of the variable in 
the cointegrating relationship is positive, an alpha coefficient of -1 would 
imply that the variable corrects the entire disequilibrium within one period. 
In all models the error-correction occurs consistently through the expected 
change in the spot exchange rate (the other insignificant variables have been 
omitted), typically correcting between one to two-thirds of the disequilibrium 
within one period.
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B P  -  3* J Y  K+i\t st D M  st+i\t ~  st
3 — year adaptive -0.375 -0.562 -0.629
(-5.099) (-7.684) (-6.468)
2 — year adaptive -0.382 -0.572 -0.624
(-5.046) (-8.160) (-6.373)
1 — year adaptive -0.372 -0.573 -0.536
(-4.997) (-8.342) (-5.359)
1 — year forward -0.388 -0.366 -0.526
(-5.278) (-6.879) (-6.135)
2 — year forward -0.440 -0.621 -0.394
(-5.864) (-8.578) (-4.701)
3 — year forward -0.417 -0.640 -0.727
(-5.426) (-8.712) (-7.156)
3.3.2 Covariance and Variance
Given the previous results, we can now combine the effect of the covariance 
with the realized volatility measure from the previous chapter. The derivation 
of the CCAPM in Engel (1996) implies a role for the variance. The results will 
focus on the two-year backward-looking covariance measure, which yielded 
the best performance, and the forward-looking realized volatility measure, 
though the results are unaffected with the backward-looking volatility. There 
are two important patterns to note. The volatility term is highly insignificant
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in the relation with the premium for all three samples. This result is similar 
to that in chapter two, though actually even more so true once the covariance 
term is already included. Secondly, the inclusion of the volatility term has 
a rather negligible impact on the estimates of the covariance’s effect on the 
premium and the degree of stationarity to the relation. The estimates for 
the error-correction are also negligibly impacted by including the realized 
volatility, and thus have been omitted.
/3 vector Vlead Cov const. mean s h if t p  — value
D M /U S D -0.018 11.294 0.000 0.006 0.371
(-0.000) (3.636) (0.136) (-2.511)
B P /U S D 0.676 3.597 0.000 — 0.431
(0.277) (1.751) (0.721) —
J Y /U S D 0.007 6.803 0.001 -0.013 0.618
(0.000) (2.643) (1.740) (-4.158)
Again similar to chapter 2 we do see some effects of volatility in the short- 
run dynamics, suggesting it is the change in volatility which affects changes 
in the other variables, as opposed to there being a relationship in levels as in 
the cointegrating space. As in chapter 2, there are large magnitude effects of 
volatility on expectations, though they are insignificant, suggesting the large 
impact of volatility on the expected change in the exchange rate is fluctuating 
over time and thus not precisely estimated. The volatility does however 
appear to have some significant effects on the change in the covariance in the 
DM sample, as well as for’ the bond rates in the yen sample.
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A (5m |t -  st) Abt
<1 A  Covt
D M A V 1.608 -0.000 0.003 0.008
(1.023) (-0.004) (0.077) (3.296)
D M A V _! 0.536 -0.005 -0.030 -0.004
(0.246) (-0.180) (-0.616) (1.294)
D M  AV-2 0.283 . 0.013 -0.008 -0.005
(0:182) (0.644) (-0.242) (-2.200)
B P A V 4.449 -0.263 -0.195 -0.029
(0.539) (-0.995) (-0.761) (-1.392)
B P A V ^ 14.499 -0.443 -0.091 0.005
(1.518) (-1.447) (-0.308) (0.200)
BPAV-2 3.186 -0.480 -0.280 -0.025
(0.371) (-1.804) (-1.018) (-1.158)
J Y A V 31.076 -10.703 -4.557 -0.141
(0.417) (-3.537) (-2.112) (-0.940)
JY A V ._! -38.627 -5.791 -3.279 -0.187
(-0.506) (-1.870) (-1.485) (-1.213)
J Y  AV_2 -13.890 -3.247 -2.799 -0.077
(-0.194) (-1.116) (-1.350) (-0.530)
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3.3.3 Covariance and the Real Exchange Rate
Given the significant results for the Keynes-IKE gap model of the previous 
chapter, it is of interest to further inquire whether there is a role to com­
bine prospect theory and EUT into a model of the premium. Simultaneous 
estimation with covariance and the gap effect leads to increasingly plausible 
coefficients on the covariance term. The significance however seems to ei­
ther be largely absorbed by the gap or the two both become less significant 
(whereas they were both significant individually).
2 — yr back Cov Gap Constant M ean S h if t p  — value
B P 2.377 1.365 0.002 0.417
(1.231) (1.758) (2.237) s
J Y 4.343 0.614 -0 .003 0.012 0.752
(1.585) (1.148) (-1 .985) (5.411)
D M 1.405 3.039 -0.001 0.014 0.749
(0.339) (2.561) (0.465) (3.931)
B P  s*+i|t -  st J Y  St+i|* st D M  K+i\t ~ st
error — correction -0 .453 -0 .615 -0 .683
(-5 .692) (-8 .584) (-6 .579)
This suggests a multicollinearity between the two in that they are captur­
ing related, or at least highly correlated, dimensions of risk. One conjecture 
could be that there is a non-linear response of the exchange rate to interest
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rates conditional on the real exchange rate. For example, when the gap is 
large, meaning the exchange rate is further over-valued relative to PPP, a 
given decrease in the interest rate (corresponding to low consumption growth 
and expansionary monetary policy) may produce a larger decrease in the ex­
change rate, and hence a more pro-cyclical payoff when the real exchange 
rate is large. The exact nature of the connection between the real exchange 
rate and the covariance is left for future research.
3.4  C onclusion
This work provides a possible partial reconciliation for the implausibly large 
estimates of risk aversion produced by the canonical CCAPM. Simply stated, 
if individuals use a sufficiently long, backward-looking rolling window (of a 
couple of years or more) to infer about the covariance of returns and consump­
tion, their expected returns can be rationalized in the CCAPM framework 
with more reasonable degrees of risk aversion. Whereas it had previously 
been deduced that consumption was not variable enough to account for re­
turns, this work would tend to suggest that consumption is (nearly) variable 
enough to account for expected returns and rather ex post returns are merely 
too variable of a proxy for expected returns. Once REH is relaxed both in 
terms of the expected return and in allowing for backward looking inference 
about the covariance, the estimates of risk aversion become much more rea­
sonable. The plausibility of the estimates is further enhanced by inclusion of
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the real exchange rate, though there appears to be a fair amount of multi- 
collinearity present between the covariance and real exchange rate, and the 
latter seems to absorb much of the effect of the former. The exact connection 
between the real exchange rate and the covariance between the exchange rate 
and consumption, first identified here, opens up interesting possibilities for 
future research.
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4 CHAPTER IV: ARE RISK PREM IA RELATED TO REAL
EXCHANGE RATE SW INGS? SURVEY EXPECTATIONS 
AND 1(2) TRENDS
Abstract
This paper tests .the ex ante implications of Frydman and Goldberg’s 
Keynes-Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) gap model in such a way as 
to overcome the endogeneity bias and data restrictions of previous work. The 
IKE gap model relates the expected excess return (measured here through 
survey data for three exchange rates) to the deviation or "gap" between 
the exchange rate and its benchmark value, proxied with Purchasing Power 
Parity. Strong support is found for this hypothesis in an 1(2) Cointegrated 
VAR analysis. This statistical framework more adequately addresses non- 
stationarity and provides a better examination of the driving and adjustment 
dynamics. Evidence of persistent changes, or near 1(2) behavior, is found for 
several variables including relative interest rates and prices, as well as for the 
real exchange rate in some instances, which is contrary to REH theory but 
consistent with the IKE theory.
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4.1  R isk  and Long Sw ings
Chapter 2 found strong support for the Keynes-IKE model of the currency 
risk premium and its prediction that the premium co-moves positively with 
the gap between the exchange rate and its benchmark value (this gap being 
measured through the real exchange rate). That study extended the original 
empirical work of Frydman and Goldberg (2007) in several ways. It used the 
Cointegrated VAR model to more explicitly address non-stationarity and to 
conduct estimation as a system of simultaneous cointegrating relations. It 
also re-specified the gap in terms of the current exchange rate to alleviate 
worry of an upward endogeneity bias, potentially invalidating the conclusion 
that the gap and premium co-move positively. The analysis in chapter 2 also 
reduced the number of untested data restrictions by decomposing the risk 
premium into the two interest rates and the expected change in the exchange 
rate. This provides the additional benefit of elaborating the dynamics of the
system, which variables are driving the equilibrium and which are adjusting
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back to it. It was found in all three currency markets that the interest rates 
were weakly exogenous, their shocks leading to the stochastic trends pushing 
the equilibrium, while the expected change in the exchange rate was strongly 
error-correcting, both consistent with the IKE theory.
Estimation in the 1(1) model however still required two variable trans­
formations, one for the gap measure and another for the expected change in 
the exchange rate. Consequently, it could not be determined whether the
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adjustment is coming through expectations, the exchange rate, or both. It 
also cannot be determined whether relative prices (PPP) are adjusting or 
driving the relationship, since it similarly is included through a composite 
variable with the exchange rate to produce the real exchange rate. These 
transformations were necessary as a way to address large roots in the 1(1) 
model, though they do constitute untested data restrictions and obscure the 
dynamics of the relation.
These transformations were required in the 1(1) model because of the 
near 1(2) behavior, or persistent changes, of prices. Beginning in the early 
1990’s, researchers began to find that nominal prices, including exchange 
rates, were more persistent than commonly believed, actually undergoing 
persistent changes. Hamilton and Engel (1990) for example rejected a ran­
dom walk in favor of a broken trends model, whereby the exchange rate 
follows a random walk with a time-varying drift which alternates between 
a fixed positive and negative value according to a Markov chain. Johansen 
(1997) developed the polynomial cointegration framework to address these 
persistent changes (or near 1(2) behavior) without loss of information, as 
is the case if one simply works with differences or nominal-to-real transfor­
mations. The 1(2) model can actually be viewed as a generalization of the 
broken trends model, where the time-varying drift fluctuates stochastically 
between a continuum of values.36 While Engel and Hamilton were concerned 
primarily with the degree of exchange rate persistence, the 1(2) model can
36See Johansen, Juselius, Frydman and Goldberg (2010)
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focus on not only its degree, but also its source, and the multi-cointegrating 
equilibrium relationships between variables.37
The 1(2) model will also allow for more rigorous testing of the Keynes- 
IKE gap model without the need for untested data restrictions. The results 
are quite consistent across all three currency markets. The Keynes-IKE gap 
relation still appears to hold quite well even under this more rigorous testing, 
as it constitutes a stationary cointegrating relation which we can interpret 
as an equilibrium between the risk premium and the gap. There appears 
to be near I(2)-type behavior occurring for the interest rate differential and 
relative prices at very high significance levels, as well as in the real exchange 
rate in some instances. The persistent changes of the real exchange rates 
are problematic for standard theory, even REH bubble models, but is fully 
compatible with the IKE model.
4.2  P rev iou s T ests o f  th e  K eyn es-IK E  G ap M od el
The earliest studies (Frydman and Goldberg 2007 and Stillwagon 2010) test­
ing the gap model both measure st\t+i with survey data on traders’ actual 
forecasts. Both also proxy the benchmark via PPP. The choice of bench­
mark is not terribly crucial however, in that the defining characteristic of 
the benchmark is that it moves much more gradually than the asset price
37Multi-cointegration implies that there is a stationary relationship between the vari­
ables in levels as well as the differenced processes of the 1(2) variables. See section 31 on 
Polynomial Cointegration for further discussion.
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itself, thus any increase in the exchange rate would be an increase in the 
gap irrespective of the benchmark (either becoming more over-valued or less 
under-valued).
Frydman and Goldberg (2007) conduct testing with a  composite variable 
for the premium rt\t+i =  s{|t+i — st +  — it, measure the gap as st\t+i — 5 “M,
and proxy IF P t with interpolated bilateral current account data, though 
they find no evidence of its importance for the premium. They conduct esti­
mation within the Engel-Granger (1987) error-correction model, though they 
do not conduct testing for non-stationarity of the individual variables or the 
stationarity of the cointegrating relation. They find evidence of parameter 
instability for all three samples using the CUSUM test and split all three 
samples during approximated breaks in the early 1990’s. They find support 
for the main prediction of the model (a t >  0) for both the full and sub-sample 
estimates.
One issue with estimating a t from the above specification is that there 
is a positive endogeneity bias, the variable Jt|t+i enters both sides of the 
regression with the same sign, and thus the regressor is positively correlated 
with the error term. The estimates of the gap coefficient would tend to have 
an upward bias then, which is problematic given our alternative hypothesis 
is ot >  0.
Chapter two attempts to remedy this by also estimating the gap as 
st — s®M, which would produce a negative endogeneity bias, and still finds 
a positive and statistically significant estimate of the gap coefficient. He
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finds little difference in the point estimates of the two specifications, sug­
gesting this bias is quite minor in magnitude, perhaps due to' the granger 
causality nature of the VECM.
Chapter two extends the work of Frydman and Goldberg (2007) in a few 
other ways, most notably perhaps by comparing and jointly estimating the 
effect of exchange rate volatility on the premium. This work also attempts 
though to provide more rigorous testing of the gap model and a better un­
derstanding of the driving and adjustment process behind this equilibrium. 
The information set decomposes the premium into three terms, the expected 
change in the exchange rate [st|t+i — «t] and the two interest rates i* and it . 
The use of the premium restriction from the outset constitutes an untested 
assumption however. Testing this restriction explicitly serves two purposes, 
the first being more rigorous testing of the theory. The second is that it al­
lows for a better examination of the driving and adjustment process, whereas 
the use of a composite variable for the premium is likely to muddle these dy­
namics, since some variables within the premium are likely to be driving 
(exogenous) while others are likely to be adjusting (endogenous).
Through use of the Cointegrated VAR, chapter two tests for non-stationarity 
of the individual variables and stationarity of the relationships using more 
powerful multivariate tests, and conducts estimation as a system of simul­
taneous equations. He finds that the cumulated shocks to the system are 
deriving primarily from interest rates, and error-correction is occurring pri­
marily through the expected change in the exchange rate, and with a very
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rapid adjustment. Stillwagon omits a  measure of IF P t , as the bilaterial cur­
rent account measures presented as' near-I(2) variables (undergoing highly 
persistent changes) and thus could not be incorporated into the 1(1) analy­
sis, and instead attempts to capture their impact through the deterministic 
components of the model. Using the eigenvalue fluctuation test of Hansen 
and Johansen (1999) Stillwagon finds evidence of parameter non-constancy, 
which he attempts to address through the use of broken linear trends, rather 
than by splitting the sample as done by Frydman and Goldberg.
While chapter two has attem pted to adjust a number of empirical issues 
with the earliest test of the gap model, there are still several deficiencies. 
The 1(1) model still required the application of two untested restrictions. 
The first was the use of the expected change in the exchange rate [st|t+i — st\, 
and the second was the nominal-to-real transformation used to produce the 
real exchange rate or gap measure st — . These transformations are done
in order to treat prices as 1(2), which Juselius (2006) advocates. When 
explicitly testing for near 1(2) prices using more powerful multivariate tests, 
this practice is often supported.
A more complete test of the theory would explicitly test these restrictions 
in the 1(2) framework. This also allows for a more direct means of addressing 
the endogeneity bias, as estimation can occur in the 1(2) model without the 
need for the nominal-to-real transformations used in the 1(1) estimation. Re­
arranging the Uncertainty adjusted UIP relation, the exchange rate variable 
can be made to only appear on the left-hand side.
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St — (1 — crt)st|t+i +  cqsBM +  ij1 ~ H ~  M IFPt  — pt +  £t
The gap effect hypothesis implies ot > 0. The above restrictions provide 
a quite stringent test of the theory.
The 1(2) model also allows for a more detailed examination of the driving 
and adjustment process. An immediate question from the 1(1) CVAR results 
in chapter two is the apparent source of the adjustment. While the error- 
correction was consistently observed in the expected change in the exchange 
rate, it cannot be discerned whether this is occurring through adjustment of 
the exchange rate, the expected exchange rate, or both.
The 1(2) model also allows for focus on what turns out to be a related 
puzzle in the IKE framework, the long swings puzzle. The 1(2) model tests 
and allows for persistent changes to the variables, which have often been ob­
served when tested. Consequently, through this empirical framework we can 
examine the degree and source of real exchange rate persistence. The model 
also allows for a multi-tier adjustment, of the changes in the variables to the 
long-run equilibrium relationship in levels (as in the standard error-correction 
model) but also a medium-run adjustment of the acceleration rates to the 
changes in other variables. Examining this more complex dynamic adjust­
ment of expectations in this 1(2) framework is a primary novel contribution 
of this work.
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4.3  P o lyn om ia l C o in tegration
Without loss of generality the 1(2) model can be discussed in terms of accel­
eration rates, changes and levels for a VAR(3) specification:
A2xt = +  rAxt_x + Hxt—i + Po t  p\t  +  £t
t =  1982 : 12,...,2000 : 09
where x't =  [st,st|t+i, st PP>i*t ~  H ,A it\, the information set thus is com­
prised of the spot exchange rate, the forecast of the next period exchange 
rate, an estimate of the PPP  value of the exchange rate, the interest rate dif­
ferential (measured in three month and 1 0  year bond rates), and the change 
in the domestic interest rate. Whereas the hypothesis that x t is 1(1) is a re­
duced rank condition on II =  a/3' where a , (3 are p x r ,  where p  is the number 
of included variables in the information set and r  is the rank, the hypothesis 
that xt is 1(2) is an additional reduced rank restriction on P. a'^V/3± =  
where £ , 7 7  are (p — r) x Sj and si is the number of 1 (1 ) common stochastic 
trends. The first condition is related to the variables in levels while the sec­
ond is related to the variables in first differences. The interpretation of this 
second 1 (2 ) condition is that the differenced series also contain unit roots.
Polynomial cointegration implies a relationship in levels, which becomes 
1 (1 ), combining with the differenced process to produce a trend stationary 
equilibrium condition f3'xt +  S'Axt .
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4.3.1 Determining the two reduced rank conditions
The number of multi-cointegrating relations r  and the number of 1(1) trends
among the common stochastic trends (p — r ) can be inferred using the 
maximum likelihood procedure of Nielsen and Rahbek (2006). The trace 
test is computed as a joint hypothesis for all possible combinations of r  and 
s i . The tests are nested within rows (for a given rank) and nested in the last 
column (corresponding to the 1(1) model where there are no S2 trends. The 
results should be interpreted as beginning with the most restricted model in 
the upper-left (r =  0, Si = 0, S2 =  p — r) then continuing until the end of the 
row, and then moving down to the next row and testing from left to right 
again, proceeding until the first acceptance. For the sake of brevity, only the 
p-values are presented above and not the test statistics. All lower rank tests 
have p-value =  0.000.
DM/USD short rates 1(2) Trace test
p — r r s2 =  4 s2 =  3 s2 — 2 s2 — 1 s2 =  0
4 2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
3 3 (0.000) (0.000) (0.560) (0.068)
2 4 (0.571) (0.965) (0.186)
1 5 (1.000) (0.522)
140
DM/US'D long rates 1(2) Trace test
p — r r s2 =  4 52 =  3 s2 — 2 s2 =  1 s2 — 0
4 2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.068
3 3 0.000 0.001 0.861 0.098
2 4 0.831 0.935 0.159
1 5 0.999 0.351
JY/USD short rates 1(2) Trace test
p — r r s2 =  4 s2 =  3 s2 — 2 52 — 1 s2 =  0
4 2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015)
3 3 (0.000) (0.000) (0.402) (0.269)
2 4 (0.225) (0.284) (0.451)
1 5 (0.476) (0.676)
JY/USD long rates 1(2) Trace test
p —  r r s2 =  4 s2 =  3 s2 — 2 52 =  1 52 =  0
4 2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.085)
3 3 (0.000) (0.000) (0.590) (0.368)
2 4 (0.557) (0.858) (0.509)
1 5 (0.997) (0.674)
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BP/USD short rates 1(2) Trace test
p — r r s2 =  4 s2 =  3 s2 — 2 s2 =  1 s2 — 0
4 2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.067)
3 3 (0.000) (0.000) (0.454) (0.254)
2 4 (0.468) (0.434) (0.299)
1 5 (0.686) (0.448)
BP/USD long rates 1(2) Trace test
p — r r s2 =  4 s2 =  3 s2 — 2 s2 =  1 s2 =  0
4 2 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3 3 (0.000) (0.000) (0.323) (0.050)
2 4 (0.238) (0.477) (0.228)
1 5 (0.999) (0.183)
The first failure to reject at the 5 or 10% level occurs for r  =  3, .s2 =  
1 suggesting a rank of three with one 1(2) trend. For the DM/USD and 
JY/USD samples with the 10 year government bond rates, the test is only 
borderline rejected for a rank of two with no 1(2) trends. The p-value is 
dramatically improved however with a choice of rank equal to three with 
one 1(2) trend. Later results testing for persistent changes clearly support 
the selection of a model including an 1(2) trend. All following results are 
estimated in the 1(2) model with r =  3, and s2 =  1-
142
4.3.2 Testing for Persistent Changes in the Variables: Tests of 
known vector in t
In order to test whether the variables undergo persistent changes, or exhibit 
near-I(2) behavior, we can test for a known vector b in f .  The null hypothesis 
is that the variable being tested is at most 1(1), conditional on A x t - Given all 
of the variables were rejected as 1(0) in the 1(1) model, a  failure to reject this 
hypothesis would imply that the variable is 1(1). If the known vector in f  is 
rejected, we conclude that the changes in the variable experience significant 
persistence, that is near-I(2) behavior. Juselius (2012) demonstrates the im­
portance of conducting tests for near-I(2) persistence in this fashion, showing 
that the standard univariate unit root tests have low power to discriminate 
between an 1(1) and 1(2) trend when the noise-to-signal ratio is low.
short rates D M /U S D B P /U S D J Y /U S D
S t 0.150 0.915 0.003
St\t+ 1 0.153 0.930 0.004
- P P P
4 0.000 0.000 0.000
i* -  i 0.033 0.117 0.006
it 0.317 0.604 0.323
A p * 0.356 0.836 0.978
Q ZPPPS t  S t 0.260 0.757 0.006
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long rates D M /U S D B P /U S D J Y /U S D
st 0.240 0.308 0.007
St\t+1 0.250 0.323 0.007
„p p p
bt 0.000 0.000 0.000
i* - i 0:439 0.003 0.079
H 0.542 0.311 0.710
Ap* 0.174 0.837 0.735
o QP P P  st — st 0.423 0.096 0.010
A few common patterns emerge. The first is tha t relative prices, repre­
sented by the PPP exchange rate s f pp , is rejected as at most 1(1) at very 
high significance levels, with a p-value of .000, for all three samples using 
a model including short term or long term interest rates. The interest rate 
differential likewise exhibits persistent changes in several of the models.There 
is also some evidence of persistent changes in the exchange rate, supporting 
previous empirical work (Engel and Hamilton 1990 and Johansen et al. 2010), 
as well as in the expected exchange rate and real exchange rate, particularly 
for the yen sample.
4.3.3 Identification of the Long-run structure and Tests of the 
Gap Model
In order to produce standard errors and estimate the system, restrictions 
must be imposed on each of the polynomially cointegrating relations. This
is achieved for the first relation by imposing the restrictions implied by the 
uncertainty-adjusted UIP equilibrium. Capturing the IFP term and any 
other omitted variable with a broken trend yields the following equation:
st -  (1 -  crt)st\t+i ~  o t sppp  +  {i*t -  i t ) +  pt =  et (43)
The coefficient on sppp is the estimate of the gap effect.
The other two relations are just-identified. Their two restrictions are 
fully arbitrary and alternative just-identifying restrictions would not alter 
the likelihood. In turn, these results have been omitted.
St St|t+1 ~p p pbt h-i t trend break p value
DM 1.000 -0.961 -0.039 1.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.067
(14.228) (-14.000) (-5.201) (14.228) (-5.189) (-2.075)
BP 1.000 -0.962 -0.038 1.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.500
(32.270) (-32.281) (-4.450) (32.270) (-5.479) (-2.533)
JY 1.000 -0.989 -0.004 1.000 - 0.000 0.000 0.915
(13.995) (-13.674) (-3.006) (13.995) (-1.615 (0.212)
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Si St|t+1 „ P P Pt if it trend break p value
DM 1.000 -0.914 -0.086 1.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.820
(15.025) (-14.130) (-9.525) (15.025) (8.374) (-4.773)
BP 1.000 -0.892 -0.108 1.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.101
(12.653) (-11.744) (-14.696) (12.653) (63.946) (-8.882)
JY 1.000 -0.987 -0.013 1.000 0.000 - 0.000 0.271
(12.718) (-12.546) (-87.037) (12.718) (10.589) (-1.978)
The top table represents the tests of the Keynes-IKE gap model using 
short-term interest rates, while the bottom table represents the tests using 
long-term interest rates. In all cases we can not reject that the Keynes-IKE 
gap model forms a stationary cointegrating relationship, which can be inter­
preted as an equilibrium condition consistent with previous equation This is 
an extremely stringent hypothesis test, as, following the normalization, there 
is actually only one free parameter. Further the gap effect, represented by 
the coefficient on the PPP  exchange rate is in all cases of the hypothesized 
sign and statistically significant. In the case of the DM sample with long 
rates, it is quite close to the rejection region, but is quite stationary with 
long term rates, and vice versa for the BP sample, but overall there appears 
to be a great deal of support for this stringent hypothesis of the model.
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4.3.4 T h e  source o f rea l exchange ra te  p ersis ten ce : 1(2) tre n d s  
an d  erro r-increasing  b ehav io r
The alpha orthogonal vectors a±_ determine the loadings to  the common 
trends. The variables which are significant have shocks which accumulate 
over time, driving the equilibrium. The ct/J_1(l) and a'±1 (2) vector represent 
the loadings to the two 1(1) trends. Of particular interest is the 0 ^ 2 (1 ) vector 
which represents the loadings to the 1(2) trend, producing the additional 
persistence beyond 1(1) leading to persistent changes in the variables. The 
effects of the spot rate and expected future spot rate were almost wholly 
insignificant (with the exception of the spot rate for the JY  sample with long 
rates which was of small magnitude, -0.014) and thus were omitted for the 
sake of space.
J Y /U S D  short rates A 2s f PP A 2(it ~i*t ) A H*t A2 A p*
321.488 15.229 68.811 5.407
(1.500) (0.684) (4.307) (0.073)
< i ( 2 ) -320.352 -15.279 -68.784 -5.390
(-1.494) (-0.687) (-4.306) (-0.073)
a J_2(l) 0.055 1.000 -15.279 -0.003
(2.638) (NA) (-0.687) (-0.074)
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J Y /U S D  long rates A 2sppp A 2(it -i*t ) A%* A 2A p*
< r ( l ) 12.319 -4.451 4.647 1.657
(1.844) (-5.115) (9.429) (0.605)
« li(2 ) -11.621 4.382 -4.704 -1.570
(-1.724) (4.985) (-9.450) (-0.605)
a X2(l) 0.147 1.000 0.570 -0.005
(3.085) (NA) (1.981) (-0.128)
D M /U S D  long rates A 2sPPP A 2{it -i*t ) A \ A 2A p*
-2480.127 1142.979 -373.695 -798.281
(-0.578) (8.279) (-1.437) (0.501)
< i(2 ) 2480.597 -1142.992 373.617 798.281
(0.578) (-8.278) (1.437) (0.501)
a ±2(l) 0.168 0.737 1.000 0.050
(1.532) (2.219) (NA) (0.994)
D M  /U S D  short rates A 2s [ PP A2{it -i*t ) ' A H*t A2A p*
-46.482 155.364 -256.84 6.067
(-0.064) (1.399) (-3.076) (0.053)
<*±1(2) 24.663 -81.352 134.562 -3.514
(0.065) (-1.397) (3.074) (-0.054)
CkJ_2 (1) -0.219 1.584 1.000 0.075
(-2.003) (4.890) (NA) (2.528)
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B P /U S D  short rates A2s f pp A 2(it -i*t ) AH* A2A p*
a x i(l) 352.059 -276.938 250.097 -245.976
(0.382) (-1.328) (4.044) (-0.380)
< x (2 ) -352.184 276.793 -250.011 246.110
(-0.382) (1.328) (-4.043) (0.380)
a ±2(1) -0.073 0.736 1.000 0.081
(-2.265) (7.328) (NA) (4.861)
B P /U S D  long rates A 2sppp A 2(<t -<T) AH; A2A p*
-823.125 -132.780 256.447 268.339
(-1.907) (-1.621) (7.279) (0.723)
«±i(2) 823.824 132.846 -256.457 -268.558
(1.908) (1.622) (-7.279) (-0.723)
a J.2(l) -0.085 1.000 132.846 0.022
(-2.758) (NA) (1.622) (0.553)
A quite robust pattern emerges. The common stochastic trends are gener­
ated by shocks to the interest rates and relative prices. The 1(1) trends seem 
to derive primarily from the interest rate level, while the 1(2) trend seems to 
originate primarily from relative prices and the interest rate differential.
4.3.5 D ynam ics of A d ju s tm e n t a n d  P o sitiv e  F eedback
The adjustment dynamics in the 1(2) model are often the most difficult to 
interpret. The a[ vector demonstrates how the acceleration rates adjust to
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changes in the other variables. An insignificant coefficient would suggest 
that the acceleration rates of that variable are not responding to shocks in 
the system. In order to interpret the significant adjustment we also need 
the 5 vector. If the coefficient for a given variable has opposite signs in the 
two vectors, it implies that the acceleration rates are error-correcting. If the 
signs are identical, it implies error-increasing behavior, that is the variable 
is moving away from equilibrium in the medium-run. If a^Sij <  0, then 
the acceleration rates are equilibrium-correcting to the changes (medium- 
run adjustment). If 6^(3  ^ > 0 then the changes are equilibrium correcting 
to the levels (long-run adjustment).
Recall that the relationship in levels is st — (1 — a t )st\t+i — crt sppp  -I- (i*. — 
it) +  pt =  et where a t was positive but less than one in all cases, so the 
sign of the exchange rate is positive, while the sign of the expected and PPP  
exchange rate were negative.
J Y  short A 2st A2St|t+i A 2sppp A2(^ -* n A 2i*t A2A p*
«i 0.986 1.224 0.030 0.004 -0.015 1.148
(0.372) (0.459) (0.127) (0.213) (-0.827) (9.926)
5 0.044 0.045 0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
J Y  long A 2st A2st|i+1 A 2sPPP A 2(it -i*t ) A H; A2A p*
a i 52.646 49.819 3.316 0.416 -0.091 -3.025
(5.655) (5.356) (4.036) (4.290) (-1.404) (-7.666)
8 -0.091 -0.093 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 0.000
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D M  short A 2 st A2st|t+1 A 2s f pp A 2i*t A2Ap*
a[ -0.892 -0.122 -0.022 -0.003 0.003 —0.022
(-3.393) (-0.429) (-1.785) (-1.472) (1.624) (-1.785)
5 -0.668 -0,727 -0.115 -0.035\ 0.020 0.002
D M  long A 2st A2St|t+i A 2s f pp A 2{it -i*t ) A \ A2A p*
«i -0.865 0.009 -0.004 -0.001 0.000 -0.022
(-3.030) (0.030) (-0.235) (-0.441) (0.084) (-1.738)
8 -2.381 -2.542 -0.838 -0.014 0.049 0.042
B P  short A 2st A 2St|t+i A 2s?pp A H\ A2A p*
-0.756 -0.009 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.013
(-11.379) (-0.048) (-1.426) (0.531) (0.531) (-1.426)
5 -0.872 -0.799 0.750 0.131 -0.038 0.011
B P  long A2st A2St|t+i A 2s f pp A 2(it -i*t ) A 2i*t A2Ap*
-0.205 0.530 -0.030 -0.004 0.005 0.010
(-0.535) (1.313) (-0.929) (-1.089) (1.671) (0.502)
<5 1.053 1.152 -0.271 -0.055 0.021 -0.016
The results above indicate that in four of six cases the exchange rate is 
error-increasing, or moving away from equilibrium, so for example following a 
positive shock to the foreign interest rate differential, the exchange rate tends 
to appreciate providing further positive feedback to the system. Expectations 
do not appear to be adjusting in most cases in the medium run, but do appear
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to be adjusting back to equilibrium over the long run in four of the six cases.
4.4  C onclusion
The polynomial cointegration framework has allowed for quite rigorous test­
ing of the Keynes-Imperfect Knowledge Economics (IKE) gap model, ad­
dressing the endogeneity bias and untested assumptions of previous studies. 
The model has found quite strong support across three samples and alter­
native modeling specifications including both short and long term interest 
rates. The coefficient on the gap effect was in all cases significant and of 
the predicted sign, implying that individuals look to the gap between the 
exchange rate and its benchmark value of P P P  when assessing the potential 
risk of their open positions. The restrictions implied by the model were not 
rejected in all cases, and the reformulated equation for the Keynes-IKE model 
of the premium formed a stationary, multi-cointegrating relation, which can 
be interpreted as an equilibrium. The degree of persistence to  the deviations 
from these relations were however sample and model sensitive.
The results also add to recent evidence of the existence of persistent 
changes in the exchange rate and other macroeconomic fundamentals. This 
was most clear for relative prices. Analysis of this issue in the 1(2) model 
yields several benefits. The first as demonstrated in Juselius (2012) is more 
powerful testing for persistence in the differenced process. The second is that 
it allows for examination not only of the degree of the additional persistence,
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but also the source. Similar to previous studies this appears to be deriving 
primarily from the interest rate differential and relative prices. There also 
appears to be in some instances persistent changes to the real exchange rate, 
which is inconsistent with standard REH theory but consistent with the IKE 
theory.
The 1(2) model also allowed for a  more detailed examination of the dy­
namics of adjustment. The two tier adjustment to both the medium run 
(where acceleration rates are adjusting) and the long run allows the model 
to capture a natural boom bust process, where some variables may be moving 
away from equilibrium in the medium run. A major focus here was on the 
role of expectations, as measured by the survey data. It appears that the 
exchange rate is often seen to be error-increasing in at least the medium run, 
producing further positive feedback following shocks. In the long-run the ex­
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6.1 C A P M  D erivation
Let W , r, r*, and a be the initial level of real wealth, the random real returns 
on home and foreign assets, and the portfolio share of foreign securities. End 
of period ex post wealth then is Wt\t+i =  Wt [a(l +  r*) +  (1 — a )(l +  r)], which 
can be rewritten as Wt|t+i =  Wt (l +  r) +  aWt(r* — r ). Let then the expected 
end of period wealth Wt\t+x =  W t(\ +  r) +  aWt (f* — f).
Recall the utility function depends positively on expected returns, and 
negatively on the variance of the return.
u  =  U(W ,[I+Uv ^ 1) , - ^ -  >  0 , a n d - ^ ~  < 0  (44)
° V t \ t + l  O Vt \ t+ l
In order to find the first order conditions and the optimal choice for a, we 
need to develop an expression for the variance of end of period wealth v^t+ l.
v%t+1 =  E[{Wt\t+\ — Wt\t+\)2} =  E [{W t{l +  r) (45)
+aW t(r* - r ) -  Wt { 1 +  f) +  aWt (f* -  f ))2] (46)
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If we expand this out, and write (r — f )2 as a 2, (r* — r ) 2 as er2, , and 
( r—r)(r*—f)2 as cr2r„we arrive at i)^+1 =  Wt2[(l—a)2a 2-|-a2(T2» + 2 a(l—a)a2r,]
The optimization problem then is to maximize the utility function U{W t\t+\ 
Wt ( 1 +  r) +  aWt(r* -  r ), W2[(l -  a)2cr2 +  a2a 2. +  2a(l -  a)ff2r,] with respect 
to a. This yields a first order condition of:
UxWtif* -  r) +  {/2W 2[-2(1 -  a)<72 +  2aa2, +  2a2r, -  4aa2r,] (47)
=  0 -+ U 1( r * - r ) +  2U2Wt{a2Tr, -  a 2) +  2U2Wta{a2r +  a 2. -  2a2r.)(48)
Let cr2 be the variance of the return on an equal weight portfolio, with 
equal values of domestic and foreign bonds. Also let p =  The optimiz­
ing portfolio share of foreign assets then becomes:
Of note here, the second component corresponds to that of the minimum 
variance portfolio (selecting a to minimize the variance). In turn  the first 
term is the speculative component (individuals deviating from the minimum 
variance portfolio due to higher expected returns). By minimizing the vari­
ance W2[(l — a)2cr2 -I- a2a 2, +  2a(l — a )a 2r, with respect to a  we can see the 
first-order condition:
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Wt(a2„ . -  a 2r) -  2Wta{a2r +  a 2r. -  2a2rr.)  =  0 ->  (50)
(a2rr. -  *2r) -  2a(*2r +  a 2r, -  2a2rr.)  -> a =  ^  ~ f " *  (51)
. The minimum variance portfolio is independent of risk aversion. Its 
composition depends only on the relative riskiness of the two bonds. The 
speculative component meanwhile depends on yield differentials, the degree 
of risk aversion, and the relative risk. Under the additional assumptions of 
deterministic inflation rates (so all variance in wealth is due to variance in 
the exchange rate), and using only home country prices to deflate nominal 
returns, the minimum variance portfolio would hold no foreign bonds.
6.2 M od el S pecification
The price and exchange rate variables have been measured in natural log­
arithm form. The absolute level of the GAP variable, the deviation of the 
exchange rate from an estimate of its P P P  level, is large in comparison to 
the remaining variables included in the information set, and therefore the 
GAP has been divided by 100. Similarly the interest rates have been di­
vided by 1200, to produce a monthly measure comparable to  the inflation 
rates. Juselius and MacDonald (2004) similarly transform the variables.The 
volatility series has been multiplied by 100 to avoid excessively small units.
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The tables following present the coefficient estimates (with t-values be­
low) and tests of restrictions and stationarity for alternative modeling spec­
ifications for exhaustive combinations of lagged and leading volatility, short 
and long rates, and information sets with the gap and volatility separately, 
and a nested information set where the models are estimated with the gap 
and volatility separately and simultaneously. The entry denotes that the 
variable has been excluded from the information set, while the "0” entry 
denotes that it is included in the information set but restricted to zero. The 
patterns are quite similar to those reported previously, the best performance 
occurs for the model including just the gap effect, which is significant and 
positive in all cases.
Results on the Cointegrating Relations for Alternative Model Specifica­
tions
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DM/USD Summary of Premium Relationships with Short Rates
Model gap lagged leading p  — value
1 2.343 — — 0.206
(3.019) — —
2 — -4.484 — 0.005
— (-2.187) —
3 — — -1.661 0.005
— — (-2.743)
4 2.365 — 0 0.341
(4.037) — 0
5 2.353 0 — 0.323
(3.302) 0
6 0 -3.010 — 0.017
0 (-1.922) —
7 0 — 1.449 0.016
0 — (2.744)
8 2.307 -1.815 — 0.191
(2.986) (-1.877) —
9 2.408 — 2.349 0.240
(3.095) — (2.793)
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DM/USD Summary of Premium Relationships with Long Rates
Model gap lagged leading p — value
10 2.642 — — 0.351
(3.536) — —
11 — -4.677 — 0.002
— (-1.877) —
12 — — -1.542 0.002
— — (-2.542)
13 2.660 — 0 0.514
(4.563) — 0
14 2.648 0 — 0.470
(3.552) 0 —
15 0 -2.625 — 0.010
0 (-1.636) —
16 0 — 0.981 0.009
0 — (2.682)
17 2.665 -1.668 0.370
(3.587) (-1.636)
18 2.667- — 1.368 0.338
(3.560) — (2.692)
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BP/USD Results for the Premium Relationships with Short Rates
Model gap lagged leading p-value
1 2.624 — — 0.414
(3.992) — —
2 —  , 0.164 — 0.004
— (1.320) —
3 — — 0.095 0.004
— — (0.993)
4 2.589 — 0 0.524
(3.795) — 0
5 3.359 0 0.604
(4.995) 0
6 0 0.254 0.009
0 (1.942)
7 0 — 0.130 0.005
0 (1.199)
8 2.544 .101 0.218
(3.946) (1.656)
9 2.534 — 0.084 0.200
(3^906) — ( 1. 31 )
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BP/USD Results for the Premium Relationships with Long Rates
model gap lagged leading pvalue
10 2.993 — 0.413
(3.795) —
11 — 0.218 — 0.038
— (1.373)
12 — — 0.007 0.035
— — (1.494)
13 2.976 0 — 0.644
(3.797) 0 —
14 2.971 — 0 0.633
(3.782) — 0
15 0 0.195 — 0.009
0 (1.366) —
16 0 0.349 0.009
0 (1.719)
17 2.848 0.170 — 0.404
(3.761) (1.466) —
18 2.782 — 0.266 0.381.
(3.706) — (1.655)
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Yen/USD Results for the Premium Relationships with Shorts Rates
model 9aP lagged leading p — value
1 1.119 — — 0.972
(2.463 — —
2 — -0.305 — 0.082
— (-3.092) —
3 — — -0.368 0.050
— (-3.763)
4 1.117 0 — 0.522
(3.122) 0 —
5 1.079 — 0 0.689
(3.737) — 0
6 0 -0.299 0.243
0 (-3.512)
7 0 n 2 1 2 0.246
0 (-3.841)
8 1.026 ..0.20-1 — 0.977
(2.260) (-3.298) —
9 0.973 — -0.166 0.289
(2.113) — (-3.633)
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Yen/USD Results for the Premium Relationships with Long Rates
model gap lagged leading p  — value
10 1.978 — 0.384
(2.764) —
11 — ..0.253 — 0.175
— (-2:153)
12 — — 0 . 3(17 0.035
— — (1.494)
13 2.030 0 — 0.403/
(2.817) 0 —
14 1.888 — 0 0.478
(3.405) — 0
15 0 -0.166 — 0.053
0 (-2.013) —
16 0 — -.071 0.071
0 — (-2.279)
17 1.938 -0.064 0.291
(2.689) (-1.776)
18 2.013 — 0.002 0.289
(2.739) — (2.373)
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6.3 M od elin g  S p ecifica tion  and  Id en tifica tion
The methodology advocated in Juselius (2006) proceeds by developing a well- 
specified statistical model. The focus is on addressing issues of skewness (an 
absolute value greater than .4 as the rule of thumb) and auto-correlation 
(using the standard 5% threshold); as the results of cointegration have been 
found to be quite robust to heteroskedasticity and excess kurtosis (Gonzalo, 
1994). The exact timing and nature of the required intervention dummies will 
be discussed individually for each exchange rate. The multivariate normality 
assumption, requisite for valid statistical inference, is not satisfied in any 
of the models absent intervention dummy variable's to control for the largest 
outliers, or shifts in mean, as is generally the case. Representative test results 
(based on the models discussed in the main text) are provided on skew and 
auto-correlation for each exchange rate in the appendix, prior to and following 
the inclusion of the intervention dummies.
The results on the appropriate rank r of the system consistently point 
to three cointegrating relations (implying three stochastic trends, p  — r, the 
number of variables minus the rank) based on the trace test and roots of the 
companion matrix.
In order to reduce violations in the model due to auto-correlation and 
skewness, three permanent dummy variables are implemented in 1991:07, 
1991:10, and 1993:01 corresponding to outliers of 4.38, 5.94, and 5.44 stan­
dard deviations respectively, all in the German inflation series. Further, a 
mean shift was entered in 1991:03. This volatile period for the German series
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corresponds historically with the reunification. Identical timing in terms of 
the needed mean shift have been found by Juselius and MacDonald (2004), 
which uses a similar DM/USD information set, though without forecast sur­
vey data. The empirical application herein largely follows their approach.
An issue of significant skewness in the UK inflation series can be ad­
dressed with a mean shift in 1991:04, corresponding to an outlier of 6.84 
standard deviations, dummy variables are also needed to address issues of 
serial correlation related to large outliers in the GAP variable in 1992:11 and 
1992:10, of 4.954 and 3.558 standard deviations respectively, which corre­
spond to the two months following the "Black Wednesday" devaluation of 
the British Pound and break from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism 
on September 16, 1992. To address skewness in the UK Treasury bill rate se­
ries, a dummy variable is also needed for 1985:02 corresponding to an outlier 
of 4.377 standard deviations.
. The JY sample is the most difficult to model statistically, it requires three 
lags, and a broken trend which was significant at 1993:01. Dummy variables 
are also needed to address issues of serial correlation related to large outliers 
in the expected change in the exchange rate in 2000:02 and 1987:12, of 7.837 
and 5.251 standard deviations and in 1997:04 for Japanese inflation of 4.732 
standard deviations. The JY results using long rates are often sensitive to 
the modeling specification, which was not the case with the other models and 
samples.
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6.4  D M /U S D  M od el S p ecifica tion  T estin g
Prior to inclusion of deterministics aside from the restricted constant, there 
appears to be an issue of both skewness (+ /-  .04) in the German inflation 
rate and second-order auto-correlation in the residual.______________
“  st) A ht A b*t A GAPt AA pt AA p*
Skewness -0 .04 0.22 0.27 0.07 1.48 0.29
T est fo r  Autocorrelation p  value
LM { 1) 0.78
LM { 2) 0.00
After inclusion of further deterministics specified previously, both issues 
are addressed.
st)
<1 <1 A G APt AA pt AA pi
Skewness -0.02 0.15 -0.29 -0 .04 0.07 -0.00
T est fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM { 1) 0.60
LM { 2) 0.15
The information cirterion for lag length determination indicate a rank of 
one, but this specification creates an issue of significant auto-correlation, so 
a lag length of two is selected.
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Model Schwarz C riterion H — Q C riterion L M ( 1) LM {  2)
VAR{5) -79.14 -82.41 0.74 0.77
VAR{4) -80.14 -82.97 0.88 0.76
VAR{ 3) -80.93 -83.33 0.59 0.29
VAR{ 2) -81.86 -83.83 0.91 0.76
VAR(1) -82.40 -83.95 0.00 0.00
Examining the roots of the system demonstrates th a t a rank of three is 
required before all large roots (approximately .85-.9 or greater) have been 
addressed
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4
r  =  6 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.56
r  =  5 1.00 0.98 0.93 0.56
r — 4 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.56
r  =  3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.57
The trace rank test similarly indicates a rank of three.
LR Trace Rank T est r =  0 r =  1 r  =  2 r  =  3 r — 4 r  =  5
P  -  Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.97 0.82
We clearly reject all of the variables as stationary, with the exception of 
the expected change in the exchange rate.
r =  3 A (st+i|i “  st) A bt
<1 A GAPt AApt AApi
Stationarity 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00
We can reject the expected change in the exchange rate and the inflation
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rates as weakly exogeneous, but can not for the bond rates and gap.
r  =  3 A (sf+i|t s*) A bt A b*t A GAPt AA pt AA P;
W eak Exogeneity 0.00 0.61 0.25 0.08 0.00 0.00
Conversely to the tests of weak exogeneity, we can reject the bond rates 
and gap as purely adjusting, but not the inflation rates or expected change 
in the exchange rate.____________________________________  . _____
r =  3 A (st+i|t -  st) Abt A b*t A GAPt AA pt AAp*t
Unit Vector in a 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.19
6.5 B P /U S D
Prior to inclusion of deterministics aside from the restricted constant, there 
is an issue of skewness (greater than + /-  0.4) for the UK inflation rate.
A (s?+i|t ~ st)
<1 Ab*t A GAPt AA pt A  Ap*t
Skewness -0.12 0.02 0.02 -0.07 1.32 0.19
T est fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM { 1) 0.26
LM ( 2) 0.09
After inclusion of further deterministics specified previously the large 
skewness is eliminated.
A (st+i|t -  st) Abt Ab*t A GAPt AA pt A  Ap*t
Skewness -0.03 -0 .04 0.02 -0 .07 0.09 0.10
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T est fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM { 1) 0.25
LM { 2) 0.07
The information criterion indicate one lag, but the borderline presence 
of first and second order auto-correlation suggests that two lags is preferred, 
which corresponds to Juselius’s recommendation of preferring two lags.
Model Schwarz C riterion H  — Q C riterion L M {  1) LM (2)
VAR ( 5) -78.73 -81.20 0.757 0.867
VAR(4) -79.49 -81.61 0.584 0.662
VAR{ 3) -80.06 -81.84 0.002 0.024
VAR( 2) -80.73 -82.16 0.195 0.053
VAR(l) -81.40 -82.49 0.093 0.093
A rank of three is required before all large roots are addressed.
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4
r  = 6 0.98 0.98 0.89 0.61
r =  5 1.00 0.97 0.90 0.61
r  =  4 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.61
r  =  3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60
The tract test similarly indicates a rank of three.
LR Trace Rank T est r  =  0 r — 1 r =  2 r — 3 r  =  4 r =  5
P  — V  alue 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 0.90 0.66
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We reject all variables as being stationary.
r =  3 A(st+i|t st)
<1 if<1 A gapt AA pt AA pi
Stationarity 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02
We reject the expected change in the exchange rate and the inflation rates 
as being weakly exogenous, but not the bond rates or gap. _____________
r = 3 A (s*+i|t -  st) Abt A b; A gapt AA pt AA p*t
W eak Exogeneity 0.00 0.36 0.19 0.69 0.00 0.00
Conversely to the results on weak 
gap as purely adjusting, but not t
exogeneity, we reject the bond rates 
le expected change or inflation rates.
r  =  3 A(si+i|t ~  st) Abt A b*t A gapt AA pt
<1<
Unit Vector in a 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.22
6.6  J Y /U S D
Prior to inclusion of deterministics aside from the restricted trend, the ex­
pected change in the exchange rate and the Japanese inflation rates have 
issues of skewness._____________________________________   .
A « + i |t  -  st)
-O<1 Ab; A gapt AA pt AAp*t
Skewness 2.25 0.42. 0.07 0.04 0.50 0.01
T est fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM { 1) 0.43
LM { 2) 0.42
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After inclusion of further deterministics specified previously, the skew­
ness has been addressed, but there is some trade-off of second-order auto­
correlation.
A (st+i|t “  8t) Abt Ab*t A gapt AA pt A A pt
Skewness -0.20 0.43 0.11 0.05 0.13 -0 .04
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
L M {\) 0.85
LM { 2) 0.06
The information criterion indicates a lag length of one, but the first order 
auto-correlation in particular indicates the need for two lags.
Model Schwarz C riterion H  — Q C riterion LM {  1) LM { 2)
VAR ( 5) -76.86 -80.01 0.23 0.27
V A R ( 4) -77.62 -80.37 0.20 0.48
VAR { 3) -78.47 -80.82 0.84 0.73
VAR { 2) -79.21 -81.16 0.26 0.03
V A R {\) -79.91 -81.45 0.06 0.06
A rank of three is required to address all large roots
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Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4
r  =  6 0.92 0.92 0.87 0.73
r =  5 1.00 0.92 0.92 0.67
-i II 1.00 1.00 0.89 0.66
r  =  3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66
The trace test also indicates a rank of three.
LR Trace Rank Test r =  0 r =  1 r — 2 r  =  3 r  =  4 r — 5
P  — V  alue 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.95 0.98 0.82
All variables are rejected as stationary, except the inflation rates which 
are only rejected at the 10% level. _____ ________ _______^ ^
r  =  3 A (ste+i|t -  s*) Abt A b*t A GAPt AA pt AA pi
Stationarity 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.08
Weak exogeneity is rejected for the inflation rates and expected change 
in the exchange rate. _____________ _____ _____ ________ ____________
r  =  3 A (ste+i|t -  s*) Abt Ab^ A GAPt AA pt AA p*
W eak Exogeneity 0.00 0.99 0.91 0.60 0.00 0.00
Conversely to the previous results, we can reject that teh bond rates and 
gap are purely adjusting.____________ _____ _____ _______ ______________
r =  3 A (st+i|t “  st)
<1 Ab*t Agapt A A pt A A pl
Unit Vector in  a 0.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.90
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6.7 C C A P M  C hapter
6.7.1 B P /U S D
Covariance m inus th re e  years  There does not appear to be any issue 
of skewness or auto-correlaton following the inclusion of the determinstics.
A (st+i|t -  st)
<1 < ACovsub3t
Skewness 0.09 -0.19 -0.04 0.13
T est fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM ( 1) 0.13
LM ( 2) 0.86
Auto-correlation indicates the need to include three lags
Model Schwarz C riterion H  — Q C riterion LM {  1) L M ( 2)
V A R ( 5) -61.26 -62.71 0.53 0.31
VAR{A) -61.51 -62.81 0.03 0.02
VAR{ 3) -61.86 -63.01 0.55 . 0.16
VAR{ 2) -62.17 -63.16 0.23 0.04
VAR(1) -59.91 -60.75 0.00 0.00
A rank of even one or zero does not sufficiently address all large roots,
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suggesting a unit root in the differenced process.
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r =  4 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.56
r =  3 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.56
r — 2 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.50
r =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.52
r =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94
Covariance m inus tw o y ea rs  After the inclusion of the deterministics 
there do not appear to be any issues of skewness or auto-correlation.
A (St+l|t ~ st) Abt > ^5 ACovsub2t /  1
Skewness 0.03 -0 .10 -0.01 -0 .04
T est fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM { 1) 0.28
LM { 2) 0.75
Three lags appear to be needed to fully address auto-correlation
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Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion L M (  1) LM {  2)
VAR{5) -61.26 -62.71 0.53 0.31
VAR( 4) -61.51 -62.81 0.03 0.02
VAR{  3) -61.86 -63.01 0.55 0.16
VAR(2) -62.17 -63.16 0.23 ' 0.04
VAR{  1) -59.91 -60.75 0.00 0.00
There very large roots are all addressed at a  rank of one, though there 
does appear to be some persistence in the differenced process, a large root 
even at a rank of zero.
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r  =  4 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.94 0.65
r — 3 1.00 0.98 0.94 0.94 0.64
r  =  2 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.64
r  =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.67
r  =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85
Covariance m inus one y ear There does not appear to be any issue of 
skewness or auto-correlation following inclusion of the determinsticis.
^ ( st+i|t St) Abt
ST<1 A Covsublt
Skewness -0.00 -0 .09 -0.01 -0.11
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Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.52
LM (  2) 0.84
The autocorrelation indicates a need for three lags.
Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion LM {  1) L M (  2)
VAR{5) -61 .81 -6 3 .1 1 0.90 0.69
VAR(  4) -6 1 .1 7 -6 3 .3 1 0,72 0.73
VAR(  3) -6 2 .4 9 -6 3 .4 8 0.31 0.75
VAR(  2) -62 .71 -6 3 .5 4 0.00 0.22
T/AR(1) -6 1 .6 4 -6 2 .3 2 0.00 0.00
All of the large roots are addressed at a rank of one, though a rank of 
two is also borderline.
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Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r =  4 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.77 0.77
r =  3 1.00 0.97 0.86 0.76 0.76
r =  2 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.76 0.76
r =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.75
r =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75
C ovariance plus one year There is no issue of skewness or auto-correlation 
after inclusion of the determinstics
A (ste+i|t ”  st)
<1 A  b*t ACovpluslt
Skewness -0 .0 0 -0 .0 2 -0 .0 3 0.05
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.33
LM {  2) 0.94
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Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion LM {  1) LM (  2)
V AR (  5) -61.80 -63.10 0.07 0.45
VAR(  4) -62.12 -63.26 0.16 0.25
V AR (  3) -62.45 -63.44 0.10 0.58
VAR{  2) -62.66 -63.50 0.00 0.51
V A R {\) -61.62 -62.31 0.00 0.00
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r  =  4 0.98 0.98 0.82 0.82 0.62
r =  3 1.00 0.99 0.82 0.82 0.61
r — 2 1.00 1.00, 0.81 0.81 0.62
r  =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.71 0.67
r  =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.67
Covariance plus tw o years There is no issue of skewness or auto-correlation 
after inclusion of the determinstics
A (4+i|t - s*) A bt a  b; ACovplus2t
Skewness -0.18 -0 .06 -0.10 -0 .03
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.44
LM {  2) 0.88
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Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion L M {  1) LM {  2)
VAR{  5) -6 1 .8 0 -6 3 .0 9 0.76 0.72
VAR(  4) -6 2 .1 5 -6 3 .2 9 0.93 0.56
VAR{  3) -6 2 .4 8 -6 3 .4 7 0.44 0.87
VAR{2) -6 2 .6 8 -6 3 .5 2 0.00 0.54
VAR{  1) -6 1 .0 4 -6 1 .7 3 0.00 0.00
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r =  4 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.77 0.77
r =  3 1.00 0.97 0.86 0.76 0.76
r =  2 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.76 0.76
r =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.75
r  =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.75
Covariance plus th re e  years  There is no issue of skewness or auto­
correlation after inclusion of the determinstics
A (5m |t  -  st)
-o<1 A  b*t /\C ovsu b lt
Skewness -0 .0 8 -0 .0 8 0.07 0.14
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.44
L M ( 2) 0.89
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Three lags are required to address auto-correlation
Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion LM(1) LM {  2)
VAR{  5) -61 .84 -6 3 .1 4 0.65 0.51
VAR{  4) -62 .19 -6 3 .3 3 0.78 0.88
VAR(  3) -62 .52 -6 3 .5 1 0.34 0.59
VAR{2) -6 2 .7 6 -6 3 .6 0 0.00 0.60
V A R (l) -6 0 .5 3 -6 1 .2 2 0.00 0.00
There appears to be persistence in the differenced process, as even a rank 
of zero does not address all large roots.
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r =  4 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.51
r  =  3 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.50
r =  2 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.51
r  =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 0.54
r  =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.91
6.7.2 D M /U S D
Covariance m inus th re e  years  There is some issue of skewness and a
serious issue of auto-correlation even following the deterministics, but the 
rank test will rule out the use of the three year rolling window anyways.
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J> "cT t
o 1 Co cs. A bt A b*t A C ovsublt
Skewness -0.19 0.15 0.05 -0.46
Test for  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.09
LM {  2) 0.00
Model Schwarz Criterion H — Q Criterion L M (  1) LM {  2)
VAR{  5) -62.25 -63.77 0.68 ' 0.81
VAR{  4) -62.45 -63.80 0.28 0.35
VAR(  3) -62.71 -63.90 0.07 0.07
VAR{2) -63.03 -64.06 0.50 0.03
VAR{1) -60.52 -61.40 0.00 0.00
There remains a very large root even at a rank of zero, suggesting a unit
root in the differenced process.
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r  =  4 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.54
r  =  3 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.54
r  =  2 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.58
r  =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.74
r  =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95
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C ovariance m inus tw o y ears  There is no issue of skewness but some 
borderline second order auto-correlation after inclusion of the determinstics
-  st)
<1 A bl ACovsublt
Skewness -0.10 0.10 0.06 0.07
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM (  1) 0.53
LM (  2) 0.08
Three lags are required to address serial correlation
Model Schwarz Criterion H — Q Criterion L M {  1) LM (  2)
VAR{  5) -62.18 -63.71 0.75 0.92
VAR{  4) -62.43 -63.79 0.93 0.62
V AR (  3) -62.73 -63.93 0.42 0.32
VAR(2) -62.98 -64.00 0.03 0.03
VAR{1) -61.17 -62.03 0.00 0.00
All of the large roots axe addressed at a rank of one.
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Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r =  4 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.54
r =  3 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.94 0.54
r =  2 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.93 0.58
r =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.64
r =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.88
Covariance m inus one year There is no issue of skewness or auto-correlation 
after inclusion of the determinstics
A(ste+1|t -  st) A bt a  b; ACovsublt
Skewness -0.02 0.16 0.09 -0.06
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.62
L M (  2) 0.24
Three lags are required to address auto-correlation.
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Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion LM {  1) LM {  2)
VAR(5) -61.87 -63.39 0.56 0.75
V AR(  4) -62.19 -63.55 0.73 0.84
V AR(  3) -62.51 -63.70 0.25 0.39
V AR(  2) -62.78 -64.80 0.08 0.02
VAR(l) -61.97 -62.834 0.00 0.00
A rank of one addresses all large roots, though a rank of two is borderline.
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r  — 4 0.99 0.98 0.84 0.84 0.56
r  =  3 1.00 0.98 0.84 0.84 0.56
r  =  2 1.00 1.00 0.83 0.83 0.60
r  =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.66 0.66
r  =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.57
Covariance p lus one year There is no issue of skewness or auto-correlation 
after inclusion of the determinstics
A(ste+i|t -  st)
<1 A£>t* ACovsublt
Skewness 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.11
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Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.63
LM {  2) 0.41
The autocorrelation indicates a need for a lag of three
Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion LM {  1) LM {  2)
VAR(  5) -62.11 -63.63 0.58 0.12
VAR(  4) -62.34 -63.70 0.36 0.71
VAR{  3) -62.66 -63.85 0.33 0.22
VAR{  2) -62.90 -63.93 0.06 0.00
V A R (l) -62.08 -62.94 0.00 0.00
A rank of two appears to address all of the large roots, though the choice 
of a rank of two or one does not alter the results in any important one.
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r  =  4 1.00 0.92 0.89 0.75 0.75
r  =  3 1.00 0.98 0.80 0.77 0.77
r =  2 1.00 1.00 0.79 0.77 0.77
r  =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.76 0.76
r  =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.56
Covariance p lus tw o years There is no issue of skewness or auto-correlation 
after inclusion of the determinstics
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A (sm |t -  s*) Abt A b*t ACovsublt
Skewness 0.11 -0 .03 0.18 -0.38
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.52
LM(2) 0.35
A lag length of three appears need to address auto-correlation
Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion L M {  1) LM (  2)
VAR{  5) -62.31 -63.84 0.50 0.25
VAR(4) -62.59 -63.95 0.70 0.73
VAR(3) -62.93 -64.12 0.42 0.61
VAR(  2) -63.16 -64.18 0.18 0.00
VAR{  1) -61.52 -62.38 0.00 0.00
A rank of one addresses all of the very large roots, but there appears to
be some persistence in the differenced process.
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r =  4 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.52
r =  3 1.00 0.98 0.95 0.95 0.52
r =  2 1.00 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.49
r =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 0.87
r  =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90
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C ovariance plus th re e  years There is no issue of skewness or auto­
correlation after inclusion of the determinstics
A (s t+l|t -  s t ) A  bt A  b*t ACovsublt
Skewness 0.01 0.12 -0 .0 5 -0 .2 0
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.51
LM (  2) 0.11
Three lags are needed to address auto-correlation
Model Schwarz Criterion H — Q Criterion L M {  1) L M {  2)
VAR{  5) -62 .40 -6 3 .9 2 0.60 0.90
VAR(  4) -6 2 .6 7 -6 4 .0 3 0.82 0.98
VAR(3) -6 2 .9 7 -6 4 .1 7 0.18 0.36
VAR(  2) -63 .20 -6 4 .2 3 0.04 0.00
V AR {\) -60 .99 -6 1 .8 5 0.00 0.00
” There appears to be persistence in the differenced process, as even a rank 
of zero does not address all of the large roots.
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Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r  =  4 1.00 0.96 0.96 ' 0.89 0.54
r =  3 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.91 0.53
r-=  2 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.53
r  =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.52
r  =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.92
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6.7.3 J Y /U S D
Covariance minus three years After inclusion of the determinstics all
major skewness has been addressed. Further efforts to address this will lead 
to a trade-off of worsening auto-correlation.
A (4+i|t -  st) A bt A b't ACovsublt
Skewness -0.26 0.44 0.20 -0 .30
. Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM{  1) 0.31
LM ( 2) 0.15
Three lags are needed to address auto-correlation
Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion LM {  1) LM {  2)
VAR{  5) -62.25 -63.77 0.90 0.69
VAR(4) -62.45 -63.80 0.72 0.73
VAR{  3) -62.71 -63.90 0.31 0.75
VAR{  2) -63.03 -64.06 0.00 0.22
VAR{1) -60.52 -61.40 0.00 0.00
There appears to be persistence to the difference process as even a rank 
of zero does not address all large roots
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Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r  =  4 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.54
r  =  3 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.95 0.54
r =  2 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.52
r — 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.57
r  =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93
Covariance m inus tw o years  There is no issue of skewness or auto­
correlation after inclusion of the determinstics
^ ( st+i|* st) A  bt A  b; ACovsublt
Skewness -0 .2 7 0.34 0.22 0.20
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.53
LM {  2) 0.14
A rank of three is required to alleviate auto-correlation
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Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion L M {  1) LM {  2)
V AR(  5) -61.17 -62.62 0.53 0.38
VAR{  4) -61.40 -62.70 0.01 0.15
VAR{  3) -61.76 -62.91 0.62 0.54
VAR{  2) -61.97 -62.96 0.01 0.01
VAR{  1) -60.16 -61.00 0.00 0.00
All large rotos are addressed with a rank of one
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r =  4 0.97 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.61
r  =  3 1.00 0.95 0.95' 0.94 0.62
r  =  2 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.94 0.59
r  =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.78 0.77
r  =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.86
Covariance m inus one year There is no issue of skewness or auto-correlation 
after inclusion of the determinsties
St)
<1 A b*t A C ovsublt
Skewness -0.25 0.39 0.16 0.19
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Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM{  1) 0.78
LM {  2) 0.11
Three lags are required to address auto-correlation
Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion LM (  1) L M (  2)
VAR(  5) -62.25 -63.77 0.90 0.69
VAR{A) -62.45 -63.80 0.72 0.73
VAR{3) -62.71 -63.90 0.31 0.75
VAR{  2) -63.03 -64.06 0.00 0.22
VAR(  1) -60.52 -61.40 0.00 0.00
All large roots can be addressed with a rank of one, though a rank of two 
is borderline. The results are not much influenced by this choice.
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r  = 4 0.97 0.94 0.84 0.84 0.58
r  =  3 1.00 0.94 0.84 0.84 0.58
r  =  2 1.00 1.00 0.84 0.84 0.54
r  — 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.69 0.69
r =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.60
Covariance plus one year There is no issue of skewness or auto-correlation 
after inclusion of the determinstics
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A (si+i|t -  st)
<1 A  b*t ACovsublt
Skewness -0 .1 7 0.31 0.00 -0 .8 0
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.57
LM {  2) 0.70
Three lags are required to address auto-correlation
Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion LM {  1) LM {  2)
VAR(  5) -61 .31 -6 2 .6 9 0.25 0.91
VAR(A) -6 1 .5 4 -6 2 .7 6 0.00 0.02
VAR(  3) -61 .85 -6 2 .9 2 0.92 0.10
VAR{  2) -62 .10 -6 3 .0 2 0.05 0.10
VAR{  1) -61 .24 -6 2 .0 1 0.00 0.00
Covariance p lus tw o years All major skewness is addressed, though it is
borderline in all cases. There is some issue of second order auto-correlation 
though, which further dummy variables would increase.
A (5t+i|t s t) A  bt A b; A C ovsublt
Skewness -0 .3 2 0.45 0.39 0.38
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Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM (  1) 0.26
LM (  2) 0.05
Three lags are required to address auto-correlation
Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion LM (  1) LM {  2)
VAR(  5) -61.30 -62.75 0.22 0.27
VAR{  4) -61.53 -62.83 0.09 0.03
VAR{3) -61.87 -63.02 0.29 0.45
VAR{  2) -62.13 -63.13 0.04 0.05
VAR{  1) -60.33 -61.17 0.00 0.00
All large roots are addressed with a rank of one, though it is only bor­
derline even with a rank of zero.
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root5
r  =  4 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.58
r =  3 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.94 0.58
r =  2 1.00 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.53
r — 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.85 0.62
r  = 0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87
C ovariance p lus th re e  years  Major skewness has been addressed, and 
there is no issue of auto-correlation.
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^Mst+i|t st) A bt A b; A Covsublt
Skewness -0.30 0.44 0.30 -0 .08
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM ( 1) 0.43
LM {  2) 0.23
Three lags are required to address auto-correlation
Model Schwarz Criterion H  — Q Criterion L M (  1) LM {  2)
VAR{  5) -61.26 -62.71 0.53 0.31
VAR(4) -61.51 -62.81 0.03 0.02
VAR{Z) -61.86 -63.01 0.55 0.16
VAR{2) -62.17 -63.16 0.23 0.04
V A R il) -59.91 -60.75 0.00 0.00
There appears to be persistence in the differenced process as even a rank
of zero is not sufficient to address all large roots
Root 1 Root 2 Root 3 Root 4 Root 5
r =  4 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.94 0.56
r  =  3 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.56
r  =  2 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.50
r  =  1 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.52
r =  0 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.94
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6.8  1(2) C hapter A p p en d ix
The DM model with short rates seems well-specified in terms of skewness 
and auto-correlation
D M  /U S D  short rates A st Ast|t+i a  sr p A {it -  i*t ) AA i*t AA p*
skewness 0.12 0.16 0.32 0.27 -0.40 -0.12
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM (  1) 0.18
LM {  2) 0.23
The use of long rates in this sample appears to cause an issue of auto- 
correlation which is quite difficult to remedy.
D M /U S D  long rates A st A5t|t+1 a  srp A (it -  i*t ) AA it AA p*
skewness 0.12 0.15 0.32 -0.42 -0.07 -0.05
T est fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.00
LM (  2) 0.02
There are some issues of minor skewness in two of the samples
B P /U S D  short rates A st Ast|t+i A s f PP A (it -  i*t ) AA it AAp*
skewness 0.10 0.51 -0 .44 0.02 -0.30 -0.17
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.25
LM {  2) 0.13
Using long rates however it appears to be much better specified
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B P /U S D  long rates A st Ast|t+i a  sr p A (it -  if) AA i* AA p*
skewness -0.02 0.32 -0 .29 0.07 0.11 0.06
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM{  1) 0.60
LM {  2) 0.58
The yen sample with she 
minor skewness in the
rt rates 
JS infla
ias some issue of first-order auto-correlation 
tion series.
J Y /U S D  short rates A st Ast|t+x a  sr p A {it -  i*t ) AA i*t AAp*
skewness -0.23 -0.19 0.03 0.06 -0.41 0.48
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM{  1) 0.02
LM{  2) 0.10
The yen sample with long rates has some borderline second-order auto­
correlation
J Y /U S D  long rates A st A Jt|t+i a  srp A(it -  if) AA i; AA p*
skewness -0.35 -0 .28 -0.15 0.18 0.18 0.23
Test fo r  Autocorrelation p value
LM {  1) 0.43
LM{  2) 0.07
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